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The Guarantee Clause of the Constitution promises that “[t]he United States shall
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican form of Government . . . .” The
Supreme Court has long held this Clause to be nonjusticiable, and as a result, many
see the Clause as purely vestigial. But nonjusticiable does not mean toothless, and
this view fails to recognize the Clause’s grant of power to Congress. The Guarantee
Clause provides Congress with the authority to ensure that each state’s internal
governance meets a minimum standard of republicanism. The Framers included this
promise because they feared that some forms of government, such as monarchy,
were incompatible with republicanism, which they understood as representative
self-government. Nonrepublican government in one state, they believed, might have
deleterious or even dangerous effects on other states, and protection against
nonrepublican government was thus essential for long-lasting and healthy interstate
and federal–state relationships. Today, the Framers’ fears appear prescient as a
number of states engage in tactics like extreme partisan gerrymandering, which
entrenches one party in power; lame-duck legislation, which reallocates power to
undermine an incoming administration; and targeted burdens on voting. These
tactics parallel the types of democratic erosion that scholars have observed
internationally and historically. Moreover, the potential negative effects of these
antidemocratic tactics from one state to another, and from one state to the nation as
a whole, are substantial and threaten to undermine many of the benefits of
federalism. Fortunately, the Guarantee Clause allows—indeed, requires—
Congress to address these antidemocratic state-level practices.
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INTRODUCTION
“A republic, if you can keep it.” – attributed to Benjamin Franklin, responding to a
question about what kind of government the Constitutional Convention had created.
The Guarantee Clause of the Constitution provides that “[t]he United States
shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican form of Government . . . .”1
For more than a century, the Supreme Court has held that cases arising under the
Clause present nonjusticiable political questions. 2 Most scholarship about the
Clause likewise focuses on whether individuals’ claims brought under the Clause

1.
U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 4.
2.
See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 182 n.17
(1980) (finding Guarantee Clause issue nonjusticiable); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 218–
229 (1962) (same); Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 140–50 (1912)
(same); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 42–43 (1849) (same). But see New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 184–85 (1992) (suggesting that some Guarantee Clause issues may be
justiciable); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 175–76 (1875) (reaching merits of Guarantee
Clause issue).
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should be justiciable. 3 But this court-focused approach is too narrow. 4 The
Guarantee Clause is a structural promise between the states and the federal
government, not a source of individual rights. 5 And the Clause gives Congress both
the power and the obligation to act today to protect against democratic erosion
within the states.
The Framers, like many thinkers in the eighteenth century, sought a form
of government that would protect the common good by promoting virtue and
guarding against corruption. 6 Achieving this elusive goal was the essence of
republicanism. And the Framers’ experience taught them that monarchy was
inherently corrupt and tyrannical.7 They embraced self-government, in the form of
representative democracy, as its antidote.8 The government should be elected by at
least some of the People9—although of course, the Framers’ definition of republican
self-government accommodated both slavery and the exclusion of all women from
the electorate. Moreover, the Framers did not always call an elected government
“democracy,” as we do today, at least when they were comparing their new
government to direct participatory democracy, which they rejected as tending
towards anarchy, inadequately protective of minority rights, and impractical at the
scale of the United States.10
3.
See generally, e.g., Arthur E. Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV,
Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REV. 513 (1962); Thomas C.
Berg, The Guarantee of Republican Government: Proposals for Judicial Review, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 208 (1987); Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should Be
Justiciable, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 849 (1994); Political Rights as Political Questions: The
Paradox of Luther v. Borden, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1125 (1987); Thomas A. Smith, The Rule
of Law and the States: A New Interpretation of the Guarantee Clause, 93 YALE L.J. 561
(1984); Note, A Niche for the Guarantee Clause, 94 HARV. L. REV. 681 (1981); Jamal Greene,
Note, Judging Partisan Gerrymanders Under the Elections Clause, 114 YALE L.J. 1121
(2005); Patrick A. Withers, Note, Pouring New Wine Into Old Wineskins: The Guaranty
Clause and a Federalist Jurisprudence of Voting Rights, 10 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 185
(2012); Jarrett A. Zafran, Note, Referees of Republicanism: How the Guarantee Clause Can
Address State Political Lockup, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1418 (2016).
4.
See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506 (2019) (holding that “the
fact that [extreme partisan] gerrymandering is incompatible with democratic principles . . .
does not mean that the solution lies with the federal judiciary”) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978) (arguing that courts’
willingness to enforce a constitutional provision does not define the scope of that provision).
5.
See A Niche for the Guarantee Clause, supra note 3 at 688 (arguing that
Supreme Court precedents construing the Clause demonstrate that “the idea of a republic is
an idea more of structure and organization than of any specific individual rights”).
6.
See infra Section I.A.
7.
See infra Section I.B.
8.
See infra Section I.B.
9.
See infra Section I.B.
10.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 14–15 & nn.27–28, 276–80 (2006 paperback ed.) [hereinafter,
AMAR, BIOGRAPHY] (arguing that the Framers explicitly considered the republican
government they were creating to be democratic); ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 16
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Because republican government was an attempt to keep both tyranny and
anarchy at bay, the Framers were attuned to its fragility. More specifically, they
believed that departures from a republican form of government in one state would
threaten the continued existence of republican government in other states. 11 They
particularly feared monarchy and despotism as inherently corrupt and
expansionist.12 The Guarantee Clause thus arose from a recognition that the form of
government in one state could have negative effects on and in other states. The
Clause laid down a crucial constitutional marker—one with renewed salience
today—that the states owe each other a substantive commitment to compatible forms
of government. It also embodied the recognition that states might well be unable to
respond effectively if this commitment were breached; federal intervention might
be necessary.
The national and constitutional commitment to a popularly elected
government, expressed in the Guarantee Clause, has expanded and solidified since
the Framing. After the Civil War, Congress relied on the Guarantee Clause to insist
on universal male suffrage as a condition for the confederate states’ readmission to
the Union.13 And since then, the nation has expanded voting rights through a series
of constitutional amendments, as well as through Supreme Court decisions and
federal legislation. 14 American identity is intimately connected to a belief in
democracy, a word that today unambiguously encompasses representative
government. The constitutional amendments and other federal actions to protect and
expand voting rights, however, unlike the Guarantee Clause, create individual rights
enforceable in federal court. 15 As a result, academics, politicians, courts, and
lawyers have not focused on the structural protection of our commitment to
popularly elected government provided by the Guarantee Clause.
Today, we again face threats to a republican form of government. We are
facing the erosion of fundamental democratic norms and practices. Extreme partisan
gerrymandering is one example. In the 2018 midterm elections, for example,
Democratic candidates for the Wisconsin State Assembly received 53% of the votes
but won only 36 of the 99 Assembly seats. 16 This disparity was not a fluke. It was
the consequence of that state’s most recent round of redistricting, in 2011, by a

(1998) (same); WILLIAM WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 18–
19, 65 (1972); Larry Lessig, “The United States is Not a ‘Democracy,’ it is ‘a Republic,’”
MEDIUM (Nov. 26, 2015), https://medium.com/@lessig/the-united-states-is-not-a-democracy
-it-is-a-republic-54e8036c781c.
11.
See infra Section I.B.
12.
See infra Section I.B.
13.
Bonfield, supra note 3, at 540–41.
14.
See infra Section II.C.
15.
See NICHOLAS LEMANN, REDEMPTION: THE LAST BATTLE OF THE CIVIL WAR
179–80, 196 (2006).
16.
Daniel A. Lieb, Election Shows How Gerrymandering Is Difficult to
Overcome, AP (Nov. 17, 2018), https://apnews.com/3b4e63717b164dc199d02bd21aa17307.
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Republican-controlled legislature. Similar stories can be told about other states,
including North Carolina, Texas, and Maryland.17
Wisconsin voters in 2018 also unseated the incumbent governor and
attorney general, both Republicans. But in the lame-duck session that followed the
election, the gerrymandered legislature passed a series of laws removing power from
those offices, including a law that prevented the incoming governor and attorney
general from keeping a central campaign promise to withdraw from an antiAffordable Care Act lawsuit.18 This conduct too is not unique to Wisconsin. In both
North Carolina and Michigan, for example, Republican-dominated legislatures
recently passed laws to remove power from newly elected Democratic governors
and attorneys general.19
The effects of these practices are not limited to the particular jurisdictions
in which they occur. Gerrymandering, voter suppression, and election
maladministration, for example, can all affect the makeup of Congress. But there are
other, more subtle—and ultimately more dangerous—effects. In a host of recent
publications, democracy scholars, including political scientists, historians, and
comparative law experts, explain the importance of recognizing the legitimacy of
one’s political opponents; declining to take every conceivable partisan advantage
when in power; and graciously ceding power after losing an election. 20 Refusal to
do these things can manifest in the types of practices described above. These tactics,
in turn, can lead to an antidemocratic spiral, where each party and its supporters
point to the antidemocratic tactics of the other to justify more of their own. This
spiral is not limited to one state; it is contagious.
Moreover, antidemocratic action can undermine some of the most
significant benefits of federalism. In recent years, federalism scholars have endorsed
17.
Both parties have engaged in this conduct, but Republicans have been much
more effective, in part because of a concerted effort to take control of the post-2010
redistricting cycle. See Vann R. Newkirk II, How Redistricting Became a Technological Arms
Race, ATLANTIC (Oct. 28, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/10/
gerrymandering-technology-redmap-2020/543888/.
18.
Mark Berman & John Wagner, Wisconsin Gov. Walker Signs Lame-Duck
Legislation to Weaken Incoming Democratic Governor, Attorney General, WASH. POST (Dec.
14, 2018, 12:20 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/wisconsin-gov-walker-signs
-lame-duck-legislation-to-weaken-incoming-democratic-governor-attorney-general/2018/12
/14/7e181990-ffd0-11e8-83c0-b06139e540e5_story.html; D.L. Davis, Gov. Tony Evers
Reverses Position on Pulling Wisconsin from Obamacare Lawsuit, POLITIFACT (Jan. 25, 2019,
7:31 PM), https://www.politifact.com/wisconsin/statements/2019/jan/25/tony-evers/govtony-evers-reverses-position-pulling-wisconsin/.
19.
Tara Golshan, North Carolina Wrote the Playbook Wisconsin and Michigan
Are Using to Undermine Democracy, VOX (Dec. 5, 2018, 1:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/
policy-and-politics/2018/12/5/18125544/north-carolina-power-grab-wisconsin-michiganlame-duck.
20.
See, e.g., TOM GINSBURG & AZIZ HUQ, HOW TO SAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY 37–38 (2018); STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE
8–9 (2018); Christopher R. Browning, The Suffocation of Democracy, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS
(Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2018/10/25/suffocation-of-democracy/.
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the “substantial democratic benefits” that arise when laws or practices in one state
have effects in others—often called “spillovers.” 21 These spillovers can force an
acknowledgement of our interdependence, promote tolerance, and ensure that “even
in [today’s] highly polarized environment, we still engage in the everyday practice
of pluralism.”22 But when a state adopts antidemocratic practices that entrench one
party in power or appear to disenfranchise particular voters, the positive,
prodemocratic spillover effects of federalism are likely to be replaced by negative
ones, including the mistrust and suspicion described by democracy scholars.23 These
and other spillovers, along with Congress’s power and obligation to address them
under the Guarantee Clause, are the subject of this Article.
This Article makes several contributions to the literature. First, it highlights
Congress’s role in enforcing the Guarantee Clause, moving the focus away from the
courts and questions of justiciability. Second, it shows that congressional action
under the Guarantee Clause to address democratic erosion in the states is both
necessary and appropriate. Third, it argues that addressing the democratic decay at
the state level is urgent, in ways not often enough recognized, because democratic
erosion in one state threatens democracy in other states and in the nation as a whole.
In Rucho v. Common Cause,24 the Supreme Court ruled that federal courts
cannot hear claims of partisan gerrymandering. In his majority opinion, Chief Justice
John Roberts acknowledged that extreme partisan gerrymandering is “incompatible
with democratic principles” but he suggested that the solution lies in the political
process.25 The ball is unmistakably in Congress’s court.26
Part I of this Article describes the historical context and origins of the
Guarantee Clause. This Part addresses the relationships between the states
themselves and between the states and the federal government at the Founding, and
it explains why the Constitution incorporates several interconnected protections,
including the Guarantee Clause, for these political entities. Part II describes the
Clause’s underenforcement during the first 80 years of the Republic, in large part
due to the politics of slavery, and Congress’s renewed reliance on the Clause as a
source of power during Reconstruction.
Part III evaluates significant changes in American politics, demographics,
economic development, and law after Reconstruction and throughout the twentieth
21.
Heather K. Gerken & James T. Dawson, The Virtues of Legislation Without
Representation, ATLANTIC (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2015/03/why-you-shouldnt-cry-over-spilt-state-regulations/388214/; see also Heather K.
Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The Political Safeguards of Horizontal Federalism, 113 MICH. L.
REV. 57, 78–99 (2014); Heather K. Gerken, The Taft Lecture: Living Under Someone Else’s
Law, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 377, 389–96 (2016) [hereinafter Gerken, Taft Lecture].
22.
Gerken & Dawson, supra note 21.
23.
See infra Section IV.A.
24.
139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
25.
Id. at 2570 (quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting
Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015)).
26.
The Article does not claim that congressional power under the Guarantee
Clause is unlimited. Congressional action pursuant to the Clause must be in response to
meaningful threats to democracy, not a general effort to improve or alter functioning of
imperfect systems. See infra Part V.
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century, all of which are important to understanding the relevance and application
of the Guarantee Clause today. The country grew increasingly cohesive, and
Americans’ commitment to democracy gained strength. The country enacted seven
constitutional amendments and a variety of laws to protect and expand the right to
vote, all of which provide judicially enforceable individual rights. Those rights
parallel and augment the Guarantee Clause, but they do not duplicate the Clause’s
central structural promise. Part IV demonstrates how, today, new threats to our
democratic republic have emerged, making the Guarantee Clause vital once again.
Part V explores the implications of and objections to this central argument, including
a discussion of the uniquely valuable role Congress can play in enforcing the Clause,
the limits of congressional power, and the appropriately deferential standard of
judicial review.

I. CREATING AND PRESERVING REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT
Understanding the Guarantee Clause requires tracking two related but
distinct historical narratives. First, throughout the eighteenth century,
“republicanism” was a profoundly important, but remarkably malleable, ideal.
Section A will address the development of republican thought, particularly at the
Founding. Second, and more concretely, Section B will explore the relationship
between the intellectual commitments that arose from American republican thought
and the role of the Guarantee Clause as a vital structural provision. As this Section
will show, the Framers were concerned both with the physical security of the states
and with their political compatibility—and the two concerns were intertwined.27
A. The Republican Question
During the eighteenth century, political and intellectual elites, including the
Framers, were obsessed with republicanism. The term “republicanism” originally
referred to the Greek and Roman republics and their putative successes at promoting
virtue in service of the common good while keeping corruption at bay, thereby
preventing tyranny.28 But eighteenth century republican thought, on both sides of
the Atlantic, did not focus on the specifics of the classical examples. Rather, the
27.
See Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (2010)
[hereinafter Balkin, Commerce].
28.
As historian Gordon Wood explains:
According to this classical republican tradition, man was by nature a
political being, a citizen who achieved his greatest moral fulfillment by
participating in a self-governing republic. . . . This virtue could be found
only in a republic of equal, active, and independent citizens. To be
completely virtuous citizens, men – never women, because it was assumed
they were never independent – had to be free from dependence and from
the petty interests of the marketplace. Any loss of independence and virtue
was corruption.
GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 104 (1992); see also
J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE
ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 507 (2003 ed.) (“A neoclassical politics provided both the
ethos of the elites and the rhetoric of the upwardly mobile, and accounts for the singular
cultural and intellectual homogeneity of the Founding Fathers and their generation.”).
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problem republican theorists sought to resolve was the perpetual tension between
virtue and corruption.29 As a result, different people saw different, and sometimes
incompatible, forms of government as republican.
In England, a “republicanized monarchy” emerged. 30 This version of
republicanism emphasized the need for disinterested individuals to make decisions
for the common good. The king and the aristocracy had both the necessary financial
independence—commerce was deemed inherently corrupting—and the education—
only possible for those with significant leisure time—to fulfill this republican
ideal.31 On the other hand, monarchy was at risk of its own form of corruption. If
the monarch began to put his own interests ahead of the people, the country could
devolve into tyranny.32 Mixed government, including the popularly elected House
of Commons, provided the safeguard.33
This particular form of republicanism was rejected in the American
colonies. The colonies were at a great distance from the royal court, had no
representation in the House of Commons, lacked a landed aristocracy with wealth
and leisure time, and had a much flatter class structure. 34 As a result of these and
other factors, the revolutionary colonists did not see the British monarchy and
oligarchy as disinterested and virtuous stewards of the common good. 35 To the
contrary, on this side of the Atlantic, the British monarchy was seen as “inherently
corrupt” and tyrannical. 36 American republican thought thus rejected monarchy
even as English republican thought embraced it.37

29.
WOOD, supra note 28, at 104; POCOCK, supra note 28, at 486, 507–08.
30.
WOOD, supra note 28, at 98; see also id. at 95–109 (detailing this historical
development); POCOCK, supra note 28, at 468 (noting English thinkers who described England
as “a republic, of that particularly happy kind which has a king as its chief magistrate”) (citing
II CATO’S LETTERS; OR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS, AND OTHER IMPORTANT
SUBJECTS 28 (3d ed. 1723)).
31.
See POCOCK, supra note 28, at 514–15.
32.
BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
70 (Harvard Univ. Press 15th Anniversary ed. 2007).
33.
POCOCK, supra note 28, at 480–81.
34.
Pocock explains how the very different social structures of Britain and the
colonies led to diametrically opposed views about whether republicanism was compatible
with hereditary aristocracy. Id.
35.
POCOCK, supra note 28, at 509, 514; WOOD, supra note 28, at 112–13, 168–
75.
36.
POCOCK, supra note 28, at 514.
37.
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 21 (Alexander Hamilton) (identifying both
Caesar and Cromwell as the kinds of rulers to be protected against); WIECEK, supra note 10,
at 17–18; Bonfield, supra note 3, at 518–22 (citing 1 FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION 206 (1911) (Statement of Edmund J. Randolph)); Chemerinsky, supra note 3,
at 867 (citing original sources); Ryan C. Williams, The “Guarantee” Clause, 132 HARV. L.
REV. 602, 647–48 (2018); Jacob M. Heller, Note, Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Guarantee
Clause Regulation of State Constitutions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1711, 1719 & nn.27–28 (2010).
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Rejecting monarchy and aristocracy led the Framers to self-government.38
As one leading scholar of the Guarantee Clause explains, “[a] republic, almost by
definition, had to be a government of more than one or a few, for the benefit of more
than one or a few; it had to be a government of and for the many—the people.”39
James Madison, in Federalist No. 39, defined a republic as:
a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from
the great body of the people; and is administered by persons holding
their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good
behavior. It is essential to such a government, that it be derived from
the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion,
or a favored class of it . . . It is sufficient for such a government that
the persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly,
by the people.40

But the Framers also feared that democracy itself could lead to corruption
and thus to tyranny.41 They looked for ways to evoke and harness virtue on the one
hand, while guarding against corruption and a descent into tyranny on the other, all
in service of the common good. 42 One method was separation of powers. The
Framers “agreed that the state and federal governments . . . required direct or indirect
popular control of the legislative, judicial, and executive branches . . . .”43 Each of
38.
Of course, the Framers’ understanding of a government deriving its power
from the people is quite different from our own. States dramatically restricted the franchise:
in Rhode Island, for example, only white males owning at least $134 in real property, and
their eldest sons, could vote. WIECEK, supra note 10, at 86–87. Women could not vote.
Bonfield, supra note 3, at 529. Enslaved people obviously could not vote, and even free
African Americans in free states rarely had the franchise. Id. Apportionment, too, was deeply
skewed and became more so as waves of immigration increased populations unevenly within
states. See, e.g, WIECEK, supra note 10, at 18–19.
39.
WIECEK, supra note 10, at 73 (emphasis added); see also Robert G. Natelson,
A Republic, Not a Democracy? Initiative, Referendum, and the Constitution’s Guarantee
Clause, 80 TEX. L. REV. 807, 814 (2002) (concluding that Framers believed “[r]epublican
government has three ‘core requirements’: (i) ultimate control by the citizenry . . . , (ii)
absence of a king, and (iii) adherence to the rule of law”); Heller, supra note 37, at 1718
(identifying key elements of republican government as: “rule (1) by the majority (and not a
monarch), (2) through elected representatives, (3) in separate, coequal branches”).
40.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 10,
supra note 10; WIECEK, supra note 10, at 24; see also id. at 24 n.21, 65 (discussing Madison’s
views); Bonfield, supra note 3, at 526; Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 867–68 (arguing that
the Framers understood the Clause to guarantee a right of political participation).
41.
POCOCK, supra note 28, at 520.
42.
BAILYN, supra note 32, at 323.
43.
WIECEK, supra note 10, at 68; see also id. at 72 (explaining in more detail
points of agreement on necessity and components of republican government). In fact, during
the debates on the Constitution at the Pennsylvania convention James Wilson, an ardent
Federalist, emphasized that the Constitution provided that the electors of the most numerous
branch of the state legislature be the electors for the House of Representatives. As a result, he
said, the national government would be republican because “the same constitution guarantees
to every state in the Union a republican form of government. The right of suffrage is
fundamental to republics.” 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
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these branches of government “constituted a separate mode in which the people
chose to be represented,” and those they chose to represent them might “be looked
upon as a natural aristocracy,” chosen for their virtue and disinterestedness, while
the separation of powers would preclude any branch from obtaining enough power
to become corrupt.44
Yet even with this general agreement on representative democracy and
separation of powers, Founding-era republicanism was not a monolith. Indeed,
much of the debate over the Constitution—both within and between the Federalist
and the Antifederalist camps—was about different visions of republicanism. 45 For
some among the Framers, “[n]o government could be republican that did not respect
the natural rights that derived from the law of God, that did not function under a
written constitution superior to ordinary laws, and that did not act through valid
statutory law.” 46 Some Framers who were slave owners acknowledged the grave
inconsistencies between their rhetoric and their ownership of human beings, but they
resisted ending slavery; 47 others saw no contradiction. 48 Some Antifederalists
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION
AT PHILADELPHIA 482 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836).
44.
POCOCK, supra note 28, at 521; WIECEK, supra note 10, at 20–22; see also
WIECEK, supra note 10, at 74 (explaining how separation of powers counteracted monarchy
and tyranny); THE FEDERALIST NOS. 78–79 (Alexander Hamilton). They also believed that
“freedom of thought, belief, and expression . . . were inherent in republican citizenship,
allowing the people to express their views on public affairs and to guard their liberties against
government encroachment.” STEVEN J. HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH AND HUMAN DIGNITY 20
(2008).
45.
BAILYN, supra note 32, at 321–78.
46.
WIECEK, supra note 10, at 25; see also Bonfield, supra note 3, at 521 (quoting
a “staunch federalist” as arguing that the guarantee “secures to us the full enjoyment of every
thing which freemen hold dear, and provides for protecting us against every thing which they
can dread . . . ”) (quoting James Sullivan, Cassius XI, MASS. GAZETTE, Dec. 25, 1787,
reprinted in FORD, ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 43, 44 (1892)). For
an example of this perspective in action, see Justice Chase’s opinion in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S.
386, 388 (1798) (arguing that “[t]here are certain vital principles in our free Republican
governments, that which will determine and over-rule an apparent and flagrant abuse of
legislative power”). As examples, he listed ex post facto laws, “a law that destroys, or impairs
the lawful private contracts of citizens; a law that makes a man a Judge in his own cause; or
a law that takes property from A, and gives it to B . . . .” Id.; see also WIECEK, supra note 10,
at 25 n.22, 75 (discussing importance of protecting rights of minorities and protecting
majorities from tyranny of minority); Bonfield, supra note 3, at 527 (discussing Calder and
arguing that “the Court found the concept of natural justice to be an inherent limitation on all
republican government”).
47.
BAILYN, supra note 32, at 236.
48.
See AMAR, BIOGRAPHY, supra note 10, at 281 (“Slaves were akin to aliens”
and so “had no rights to participate in republican governments.”); WOOD, supra note 28, at
115 (describing southern slaveowners who “had thoroughly absorbed the classical republican
ideology of leadership and saw themselves fulfilling it”). By the early- to mid-nineteenth
century, some slaveholders went so far as to argue that slavery was not only consistent with
but valuable to republicanism because it allowed for a class of men who were neither
dependent on the market (and so not corruptible), nor busy with labor (and so able to develop
educated and disinterested views on the common good). WIECEK, supra note 10, at 152–53.
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believed that the United States was too large to survive as a republic.49 At bottom,
however, although Founding-era republican theory was largely a contested and
evolving response to an age-old question, the rejection of monarchy in favor of some
form of self-government was an accepted baseline.50
B. A Nation of (Republican) States
These different views of republicanism were largely elided in the drafting
of the Constitution, but the Framers agreed that the nation could not survive without
republican safeguards. Although the United States was founded not so much as a
single nation, but as a confederation of nations with a mutual defense agreement, 51
that arrangement proved unworkable, leading to the drafting and ratification of the
Constitution. The move from a confederation to a nation included promises that the
states would be protected. Although the story often told is that the Framers were
determined to protect the states from the federal government, or the parts from the
whole, in order to protect against tyranny 52 the protections required—and
provided—run in several directions.
The Constitution thus contains a series of provisions designed to protect
the whole from the parts politically, economically, legally, and militarily. Article I,
Section 4, for example, allows Congress to override state-level decisions about the
“Times, Places and Manner of holding [congressional] Elections.” Article I, Section
10 prohibits states from engaging in their own foreign policy; maintaining their own
militaries or entering into interstate compacts without congressional consent; and
imposing their own tariffs and duties. The Supremacy Clause of Article VI is yet
another example.
Article IV, Section 4, of the Constitution contains more such promises. It
reads: “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on
Application of the Legislature, of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be
convened), against domestic violence.” The Constitution thus promised to protect
the states from each other as well as, under some circumstances, from their own

But see WOOD, supra note 28, at 282–84 (describing nineteenth century embrace of work over
leisure).
49.
BAILYN, supra note 32, at 344, 347–49.
50.
Pocock is charmingly and dryly elliptical and ironic as he describes the
contradictions and tensions of American Founding-era republican thought. POCOCK, supra
note 28, at 506–45.
51.
See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL
IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE 101 (2008); COLIN WOODARD, AMERICAN NATIONS: A
HISTORY OF THE ELEVEN RIVAL REGIONAL CULTURES OF NORTH AMERICA 115 (2012)
(describing the American Revolution as “a profoundly conservative action fought by a loose
military alliance of nations, each of which was most concerned with preserving or reasserting
control of its respective culture, character, and power structure”); Williams, supra note 37, at
610 (arguing that at the Founding, “relations among the states and between the individual
states and the federal government were assimilated to the model of international relations
between independent sovereign nations”).
52.
See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457–59 (1991).
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people,53 and it protected the national government from the states as well. 54 Indeed,
such promises were essential if the states were going to open their borders to each
other.55
The Guarantee Clause is one of these promises, arising from the Framers’
fear of monarchy and tyranny. Monarchy was a constant threat. After Shays’
Rebellion of 1786 and 1787 threatened the stability of the new country, for example,
some people advocated establishing a monarchy or regency, perhaps out of a desire
for security and stability. 56
Obviously, monarchy was rejected at the federal level. But the Guarantee
Clause is an acknowledgement that precluding a national monarch would not be
sufficient protection. Montesquieu, the nineteenth-century thinker who inspired
many of the Framers, and Madison alike “insisted that in a confederation all
governments had to be republican because in a mixed confederacy a monarchy
would swallow up its republican neighbors.”57 As James Iredell put it at the North
Carolina ratifying convention, “If a monarchy was established in one state, it would
endeavor to subvert the freedoms of the others, and would, probably, by degrees
succeed in it.”58 In other words, if the states were to remain both united and states,
they all had to have comparable and compatible, albeit not identical, forms of
republican government—with a republican government defined in opposition to
monarchy or other despotic “experiments.” 59
The Guarantee Clause was thus a mutual nonaggression pact, beyond the
Invasion Clause, through a promise that the states’ government would be both
worthy of and inclined to mutual respect. This understanding of republicanism in
opposition to the existential threat of monarchy explains why the Guarantee Clause
appears in the same section as the promises of federal protections against domestic

53.
See Fred O. Smith, Jr., Awakening the People’s Giant: Sovereign Immunity
and the Constitution’s Republican Commitment, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1941, 1953–54 (2012)
[hereinafter Smith, Awakening]) (describing placement of the Guarantee Clause within a set
of other promises to protect states from one another).
54.
AMAR, BIOGRAPHY, supra note 10, at 44; WIECEK, supra note 10, at 33, 55.
55.
AMAR, BIOGRAPHY, supra note 10, at 44–46.
56.
WIECEK, supra note 10, at 45–49. Hamilton referred directly to “[t]he
tempestuous situation from which Massachusetts has scarcely emerged” as support for section
4. THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, supra note 37.
57.
WIECEK, supra note 10, at 26, 73.
58.
Bonfield, supra note 3, at 520 (citing 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 95 (1891)).
59.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison); see also WIECEK, supra note 10, at
56; Smith, Awakening, supra note 53, at 1957–60. “The guarantee prohibited monarchical
forms of government and assured that the powers of the national government be used to
proscribe them.” Heller likewise argues for reading the Clause as a “robust protection of
republican forms” based on his originalist research. Heller, supra note 37, at 1744; see also
Jonathan Toren, Protecting Republican Government From Itself: The Guarantee Clause Of
Article IV, Section 4, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 371, 377–78, 384–85 (2007) (describing the
Framers’ fears of monarchy and its incompatibility with republicanism).
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violence and foreign invasion.60 A republican form of government in each state was
existentially essential for each state as well as for the entire nation.61 Madison was
explicit in defending section 4 as a whole: “A protection against invasion is due from
every society to the parts composing it. The latitude of the expression here used
seems to secure each State, not only against foreign hostility, but against ambitious
or vindictive enterprises of its more powerful neighbors.” 62 Seen in this light, the
federal guarantee is particularly important. States might well be unable to protect
themselves from the effects of their neighbors’ abandonment of republicanism.
This understanding also offers an explanation for a quirk of wording that is
seldom, if ever, remarked on. 63 Article IV, section 4, makes two promises: It
promises federal protection from “Invasion” and “domestic violence” to “each”
state. But the “guarantee of a Republican Form of Government” is made to “every
State in this Union.” One way to understand this difference in language is that while
protection against violence might, at any given time, be relevant to only one state,
the Guarantee Clause was necessary for the ongoing and interdependent security of
all of the states. 64 It is then, not just a promise to (say) Pennsylvania that it is
protected from internal and external violence; it is also a promise to (say)
Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts, and New Jersey, that (say) New York would not
be allowed to adopt a form of government that could, in the long run, threaten them.
60.
This reading also makes sense of the placement of the Clause in Article IV.
Williams, supra note 37, at 626–28 (noting that all provisions of Article IV address states’
relationships with each other); Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate
Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1468, 1471–72, 1477 (2007); Smith, Awakening, supra note
53, at 1952 (arguing that section 4, including the Guarantee Clause, was intended to protect
“state integrity,” defined as “states’ existence, stability, and parity”); id. at 1953–54
(explaining how placement of Guarantee Clause in Article IV, section 4, supports this
conclusion and noting that sections 1–3 of Article IV “protect states’ integrity, largely by
protecting their equality relative to each other”); Toren, supra note 59, at 385 (reading Article
IV as a whole as addressing “the primacy of national stability” and “the states’ relationship
with the federal government and with each other”).
61.
Wiecek explains the “syntactical welding of the guarantee clause to the
invasion and domestic violence clauses,” supra note 10, at 55, as a two-part promise. The
promise of protection against violence and insurrection was a promise that the “federal
government, acting through the armed forces, would undo something that had been done or
begun.” Id. at 59; see also AMAR, BIOGRAPHY, supra note 10, at 280 (“[T]he Constitution
would offer a kind of democratic insurance policy. If any individual state system of selfgovernment fell sick and needed help, sister republics would come to its aid. In so doing, . . .
sister republics would be protecting themselves both individually and collectively. A monarch
or tyrant in any one state would pose a geostrategic threat to each and every neighboring
state.”); Toren, supra note 59, at 385 (noting that the Framers’ discussions of the Guarantee
Clause focused on “the dangers to the union”).
62.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 59.
63.
I have found no scholarly discussions of the difference between “every State”
and “each State.”
64.
As Ryan Williams has recently explained, European treaties in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries sometimes addressed potential “conflicts over internal governance”
because such conflicts “could easily spill over into international conflict.” Williams, supra
note 37, at 620; see also id. at 629.
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Or as Hamilton put it: “Who can predict what effect a despotism, established in
Massachusetts, would have upon the liberties of New Hampshire, or Rhode Island,
of Connecticut or New York?”65
This explanation also suggests a resolution to another puzzle of wording—
the use of the word “State” in the Guarantee Clause. The term “State” sometimes
referred to its government, sometimes to its people, and sometimes to its physical
territory.66 Guaranteeing a state a particular form of government, however, does not
make sense if the guarantee runs only to the state government itself, and in part as a
result, many people have understood the Clause as primarily, or even exclusively,
providing a guarantee to each state’s citizens.67 But in the context of section 4, the
Clause is best seen as a protection for states, as states, from each others’ politically
incompatible governments.68
***
The Clause incorporates an understanding that the political structures in
one state could have significant deleterious, even if not immediate, effects on the
others, and that federal intervention might be necessary to prevent the worst of those
threats from coming to pass. As Madison explained, “[t]he more intimate the nature
of such a [republican] union may be, the greater interest have the members in the
political institutions of each other . . . .” 69 In the parlance of modern federalism
scholars, political institutions in one state could have deleterious spillover effects in
others. 70 And the need for a federal guarantee is particularly acute where the
potential spillovers might arise from a state’s internal structures and political
practices, something no other state can adequately protect itself against. 71 At the
same time, the Clause embodies a commitment to some form of representative
65.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, supra note 37. On the other hand, Hamilton also
explained that the Clause would not be used to prevent “reforms of the State constitution by
a majority of the people in a legal and peaceable mode. . . . The guaranty could only operate
against changes to be effected by violence.” Id. Such changes appeared to include a political
leader refusing to leave office when voted out. Id.
66.
Bonfield, supra note 3, at 524.
67.
See, e.g., id. at 524, 534 (citing Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 720 (1869)).
68.
See Smith, Awakening, supra note 53, at 1953–54 (arguing that all of Article
IV’s promises “protect states’ integrity,” many “by protecting their equality relative to each
other”).
69.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 59.
70.
See, e.g., Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 21, at 69–73.
71.
As Jack Balkin argues, the entire structure of the Constitution, including the
enumerated powers delegated to Congress provides for federal involvement “where states are
separately incompetent or where the interests of the nation might be undermined by unilateral
or conflicting state action.” Balkin, Commerce, supra note 27, at 6; see also id. at 8 (quoting
2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA 424
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) (statement of James Wilson)) (“Whatever object of
government is confined, in its operation and effects, within the bounds of a particular state,
should be considered as belonging to the government of that state; whatever object of
government extends, in its operation or effects, beyond the bounds of a particular state, should
be considered as belonging to the government of the United States.”).
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government and a rejection of monarchy. The Clause is thus a federal promise to
ensure that the states maintain politically compatible forms of self-government. That
promise remains relevant today.

II. REPUBLICANISM AND NATIONHOOD BEFORE AND AFTER THE
CIVIL WAR
During the nineteenth century, the understanding of the republicanism
protected by the Clause continued to be contested, in large part due to its
implications for slavery. Relatedly, the question of whether and how to enforce the
Clause was a political hot potato in the first half of the nineteenth century, with each
federal branch declining active enforcement. But after the Civil War, during
Reconstruction, the Clause became a meaningful source of authority for
congressional action.
Section A of this Part recounts the history of the underenforcement of the
Clause before the Civil War. This underenforcement contributed to what one scholar
calls the Clause’s “desuetude” 72 and is important to any understanding of its
historical meaning and function. Section B connects the Clause’s underenforcement
to the burgeoning national disagreement over slavery. This Section also shows how
the national effects of slavery and the controversies surrounding it vindicated the
Framers’ insight that forms of government within some states could have deleterious
spillover effects on others.
Section C returns to the history of the Clause itself, documenting its role as
a source of congressional authority during Reconstruction and as a justification to
demand universal male suffrage. This Section ends by suggesting a relationship
between the ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and the
Clause’s subsequent return to relative obscurity.
A. The Underenforced Guarantee
During the first half century after the Constitution was ratified, rebellions
in different states prompted both congressional and presidential action. In response
to the Whiskey Rebellion in western Pennsylvania, Congress passed the Militia Act
of 1792, which it then replaced with the Enforcement Act of 1795 and an additional
statute in 1807. 73 These statutes provided that the President could call out state
militias to quell rebellions in the states, and although they rested primarily on the
domestic violence and invasion provisions of Article IV, Section 4, they also were
understood by some to implicate the Guarantee Clause. 74 But when Rhode Island
became embroiled in an internal but largely nonviolent dispute over the republican
legitimacy of two competing governments, the President declined to act, despite
invocations of the Clause and requests for his involvement from both sides of the
dispute.75 Congress and the Supreme Court also took no action.

72.
73.
74.
75.

Bonfield, supra note 3.
WIECEK, supra note 10, at 81.
Id.
Id. at 101–02.
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In the early 1840s, Rhode Island faced a constitutional crisis. It had never
enacted its own constitution and still operated under a 1663 English royal charter,
adopted as the state constitution in 1776.76 That charter limited voting rights to men
who owned at least $134 of real property, and to their eldest sons.77 In addition, it
apportioned representation in the lower house of the state legislature by town, rather
than by population.78 As Rhode Island’s population and economy expanded rapidly
in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, its voting and districting rules
“created disfranchisement and malapportionment that were severe even by early
nineteenth-century standards . . . by 1840 the General Assembly was controlled by
a rural minority.”79
By 1841, there was a strong movement in Rhode Island supporting suffrage
for all white men and demanding a new state constitution. 80 Two competing
constitutional conventions were called. The first, called by the legislature, was
known as the Freeholders’ Convention because the legislature “insisted on the
restricted freeholders’ suffrage for both election and ratification.”81 The second was
called by the suffrage activists, led by Thomas Dorr, and was known as the People’s
Convention. 82 Although the People’s Constitution received an overwhelming
majority and the Freeholders’ Constitution was defeated, the state legislature refused
to recognize the People’s Constitution.83 The suffragists formed a shadow
government and elected Dorr as “the new People’s governor.” 84 There were thus two
governments claiming legitimacy in Rhode Island.
The contested meaning of republicanism was central to this dispute.
Freeholders and Dorrites each had a claim to republicanism as understood by
different camps of Framers—law and order and regularity, on the one hand, and
reflection of the popular will on the other.85 Moreover, the Freeholders argued that
because “Rhode Island’s government was considered republican at the time it was
admitted to the Union,” it necessarily complied with the Guarantee Clause. 86 Both
sides appealed to President John Tyler, who declined to intervene directly, in large

76.
Id. at 86.
77.
Id. at 86–87.
78.
Id. at 87.
79.
Id. (“The appearance of large urban manufacturing centers in the northeastern
corner of the state was accompanied by the grow[th] of a city population that did not own
land and was therefore disfranchised. Further, some towns quadrupled their population while
others stagnated or lost residents without a change in the allocation of seats in the house.”);
id. (“Malapportionment and disfranchisement were aggravated by ethnic and economic
tensions.”).
80.
Id. at 88–91.
81.
Id. at 91.
82.
Id.
83.
Id. at 91, 95.
84.
Id. at 95. That government quickly dissolved. Id. at 96.
85.
Id. at 93–95.
86.
Id. at 94, 104; see also id. at 94 n.17 (“[W]hat was adequately republican for
1790 remained so in 1842.”).
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part due to the absence of actual violence that would have triggered the Domestic
Violence Clause.87
Tyler’s neutrality arguably established a precedent that with respect to
internal but nonviolent governance disputes, “the guarantee of republican
government extended to the recognized government of a state, not to the faction
challenging it,” and as a result, “the President is not free to choose the group that he
will aid on the basis of his own notions of republicanism.”88
Congress also stayed out of the fray. In response to what became known as
the Dorr Rebellion, a group of Democrats in the House succeeded in getting a Select
Committee to pass a report asserting congressional authority to determine if state
constitutions are sufficiently republican and responsive to the people, but the House
itself did not act on it.89
And in a case called Luther v. Borden, the Supreme Court also declined to
identify which government was in compliance with the Guarantee Clause, at least in
the circumstances the issue arose. 90 Martin Luther was a Dorrite, and in the
aftermath of the People’s Convention, Luther Borden and the other defendants, who
were “in the military service of the State . . . broke and entered [Luther’s] house and
searched the rooms for the plaintiff, who was supposed to be there concealed.” 91
Luther sued for trespass, and the case, by the time the Supreme Court heard it in
1849, came down to the question of which government was the legitimate one at the
time of the alleged trespass, with Luther claiming the Guarantee Clause required the
Court to recognize the People’s government. 92 By then, however, the state, with the
legislature’s participation, had enacted a new constitution with virtually universal
white male suffrage and representation apportioned “pro rata on the basis of census
enumeration.”93 The Dorr Rebellion was over, and the underlying disputes over the
republican nature of Rhode Island state government had been resolved internally.
Under those circumstances, in an opinion by Chief Justice Taney, the Court
refused to decide the question of whether the original Rhode Island government
complied with the Clause.94 The Court had significant practical reasons. It noted that
the Dorrites had never actually held power and that, as a result, were the plaintiff to
prevail, all the actions taken by the Rhode Island government beginning in 1842
87.
Tyler did not believe that the Domestic Violence Clause applied because, at
the time the Rhode Island governor asked for his help, “there had not yet been armed
resistance.” WIECEK, supra note 10, at 101–02, 104. But he recognized the original governor
“as the executive power of the State, and took measures to call out the militia to support his
authority if it should be found necessary for the general government to intervene.” Luther v.
Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 44 (1849). Dorr later mounted a brief and notably unsuccessful military
stand, and no federal intervention was necessary. WIECEK, supra note 10, at 99.
88.
WIECEK, supra note 10, at 105.
89.
Id. at 108–10.
90.
48 U.S. 1.
91.
Id. at 34.
92.
WIECEK, supra note 10, at 116–17.
93.
Id. at 99.
94.
Id. at 120.
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would be “nullities,”95 even including the new constitution with its expanded rights
of suffrage.96 Such extraordinary consequences had to be avoided.97
The Court’s opinion also disavowed a judicial role in enforcing the
Guarantee Clause, describing the question before it as inherently political. 98 The
Guarantee Clause, the Court said, was relevant when Congress decided whether to
seat Members elected by a state.99 By seating them, it necessarily concluded that the
state from which those Members came had a suitably republican government. 100
And the Court noted that Congress had, by statute, given the President the primary
authority for acting under the Domestic Violence and Invasion Clauses, which
required him to first determine whether the government calling on his help was
legitimate.101 Here, the President had declined to act. For the courts to then take up
that same question—leading to the possibility of an inconsistent result—would
make the Clause “a guarantee of anarchy, and not of order.” 102 The legal upshot of
the Dorr Rebellion, then, was that no part of the federal government appeared willing
to enforce or adjudicate the Guarantee Clause.
B. Slavery, Spillovers, and Republicanism Before the Civil War
This federal passivity in the face of a Guarantee Clause claim must be
understood in the context of the debate over slavery. As white southerners, neither
President Tyler nor Chief Justice Taney wanted any possibility that the Guarantee
Clause could be used to challenge slavery.103 This concern was not hypothetical. By
the 1820s, northern opponents of slavery were using the Clause as part of their
arguments against extending slavery into new territories and states, and by the

95.
Luther, 48 U.S. at 38.
96.
Id. at 41.
97.
WIECEK, supra note 10, at 119–20. Moreover, the Court held that the federal
courts “were bound by the decision of the Rhode Island Supreme Court in the Dorr treason
trial that the Freeholders’ and not the Dorr government was legitimate.” Id. at 120; see also
Luther, 48 U.S. at 40.
98.
Luther, 48 U.S. at 42, 46–47. Although many commentators have argued that
this dicta should be read narrowly, see, for example, Bonfield, supra note 3, at 535,
subsequent courts have not generally done so. Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 149–50 (1912) (relying on Luther for the proposition that Guarantee
Clause issues are nonjusticiable); WIECEK, supra note 10, at 123–29. But see Minor v.
Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875) (rejecting, on the merits, a claim that the Guarantee Clause
required women’s suffrage).
99.
Luther, 48 U.S. at 42.
100.
Id.; see also WIECEK, supra note 10, at 121–22.
101.
Luther, 48 U.S. at 43; WIECEK, supra note 10, at 122–23.
102.
Luther, 48 U.S. at 43.
103.
Tyler “well knew that, though southerners looked to the federal army for
suppression of possible slave insurrections, they resolutely opposed any federal actions that
might suggest that the southern state governments were insufficiently republican.” WIECEK,
supra note 10, at 102. He did, however, receive conflicting advice from southern newspapers
and officials about whether to intervene. Id. at 103.
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1840s, “antislavery thinkers had mounted a direct assault on slavery in the states,
using the guarantee clause as one of their primary weapons.” 104
The battle was joined during the debate over the slave status of Missouri. 105
Southern slaveholders and politicians insisted that slavery was consistent with
republicanism and that the Guarantee Clause did not authorize federal interference
with the domestic institutions or internal affairs of the states, although section 4
certainly required federal assistance in quashing slave rebellions. 106 “[O]pponents
of slavery, on the other hand, tried to read the principles of the Declaration of
Independence into the Constitution via the guarantee clause.”107 Some abolitionists
argued that the Clause gave Congress the power to outlaw slavery in all the states,
and at least one abolitionist asked a state supreme court to declare that the Clause
outlawed slavery.108
In response, slaveholding southerners argued that definitions of
republicanism were set in 1787, when the Constitution, with its three slave clauses,
was drafted and slave states were admitted to the Union,109 and that the Clause “was
an assurance, not of widening democratic participation in government, but of
historical restrictions on it.”110 In their view, “[s]lavery had no relation to the form
of government; it was a creature of police laws and could not affect the
republicanism of the state government.”111 And consistent with a vision of the states
as essential units of sovereignty whose internal workings were, for the most part,
their own business, they argued that the Clause was actually “a limitation on federal
power.”112

104.
WIECEK, supra note 10, at 136; see also id. at 142–43. Wiecek also details
some remarkable efforts by nineteenth-century proslavery politicians to explain why slavery
was not inconsistent with, and might even be helpful or necessary to, republicanism. Id. at
152–54 & nn.24–28.
105.
Bonfield, supra note 3, at 531 (detailing use of this argument during debates
over admission of Missouri to the Union).
106.
See WIECEK, supra note 10, at 148–49.
107.
Id. at 143–45; Bonfield, supra note 3, at 531–32. These arguments led some
proslavery thinkers to disavow the Declaration of Independence. WIECEK, supra note 10, at
152 & n.24.
108.
WIECEK, supra note 10, at 157–59 & nn.33–37.
109.
Bonfield, supra note 3, at 531–32.
110.
WIECEK, supra note 10, at 146. “[T]he antislavery argument carried to its
logical end was ridiculous. Children, lunatics, convicts, and women were all deprived of civil
and political rights, so why not slaves and Negroes?” Id. at 148 (citations omitted). At bottom,
the argument of these southerners was remarkably similar to those of the Rhode Island
Freeholders: republicanism was self-government by the People, as opposed to a monarchy,
but the People could be defined to eliminate more than half the population. See id. at 149;
Bonfield, supra note 3, at 532.
111.
WIECEK, supra note 10, at 146.
112.
Id.
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Over time, however, the effects of legal chattel slavery in the southern
states were increasingly felt in free states, and vice versa.113 Although at the time of
the Founding most northern states permitted slavery, by the 1830s, that had
changed.114 And as the abolitionist movement gained power, tensions between the
North and the South grew. Slave states clung to a vision of slaveholding
republicanism that the Framers had apparently accepted but that abolitionist
resistance made harder to maintain. Free states, on the other hand, found themselves
required to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act;115 unable to protect their residents—even
those born within their borders—from abduction under claim of right by
slaveholders; 116 and disallowed from recognizing African Americans as U.S.
citizens. 117 Preserving slavery in some states therefore directly implicated other
states’ ability to govern as they saw fit within their own borders.118 Slavery imposed
meaningful spillover effects on the non-slave states. These effects proved the
Framers correct in an important way. Although the Framers themselves did not see
slavery as the kind of tyranny the Guarantee Clause guarded against, its legal
spillover effects were a tragic demonstration that despotism is incompatible with
republican self-government.
Moreover, in the North, slavery was seen increasingly as a moral
abomination, setting it apart from other sources of conflict between the states. The
moral issue of slavery “could not be resolved by decentralization . . . [as] the people
in the Northern states were simply unwilling to allow the kind of state-by-state
variation on this issue that was accepted and sometimes welcomed on such issues as
banking regulation or internal development.” 119 This shift had to do with the
growing awareness of the moral horror of slavery, but it also reflected an increased
sense of nationhood. As Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin argue:
[a]t the time that abolitionist sentiment ran high in the Northern states,
Brazil, Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and many other nations practiced
human slavery, but Northerners were largely unconcerned about this
situation and certainly unwilling to make any significant sacrifices to
end it. They cared about slavery in the South – and were ultimately
113.
FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 51, at 108–10 (distinguishing between largely
economic disputes, which can be mediated or negotiated, and slavery, which cannot, as a key
driver of sectionalism).
114.
Id. at 108–09.
115.
See Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 507 (1858).
116.
See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
117.
See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
118.
AMAR, BIOGRAPHY, supra note 10, at 372 (“By 1860, the Slave Power
exemplified all the evils that the original Article IV guarantee of republican government had
aimed to avert. Aggressive slavocrats had flouted basic democratic freedoms within their own
states, menaced freedom-lovers in neighboring states, and begun to corrupt the character of
federal institutions that rested on state-law foundations.”).
119.
FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 51, at 109. Feeley and Rubin argue that this shift
gave federalism (as they define it) a role it had not had for many years. Id. Slave states, whose
leadership felt strongly enough about maintaining slavery that “they were willing to die and
kill for it” could remain in the Union only by asserting a claim of right against the central
government. Id.
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prepared to kill and die to end it – because they perceived the South
as part of their own polity and regarded the slaves as members of that
polity.120

Feeley and Rubin’s vision is more than a little rosy: African Americans,
both before and after the Civil War, have often been excluded from the polity as a
practical matter in both the North and the South.121 But the overall point is important.
A growing sense of national unity and national identity, a national economy, and
porous state boundaries had significant effects: among them, for some Americans,
an increased sense of the moral responsibility they felt towards each other, even if
they lived far apart, and a sense that activity in one state could have moral or
characterological or cultural effects in another. Slavery thus had unique spillover
effects.
The spillover effects worked the other way as well. Slave owners argued,
for example, that free states’ efforts to protect African Americans had the effect of
depriving them of their property without compensation. 122 We recognize this
argument today as, to put it mildly, inhumane, deeply offensive, and profoundly
antidemocratic. But the fact that it had purchase at the time reinforces—again—the
Framers’ insight that certain forms of government were simply incompatible with
each other. The slaveholding states eventually came to the same realization. Hence,
secession and the Civil War.
C. Reconstruction and the Republican Form of Government
Abolitionists may have been unsuccessful in their efforts to use the
Guarantee Clause as a sword against slavery before the Civil War, but during
Reconstruction, the Clause gained new vitality. Even before the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified, Congress passed a series of laws designed to ensure civil
and political rights for African Americans in the South. 123 And the Radical
Republicans spearheading these efforts seized upon the Guarantee Clause as one
source of constitutional authority for these efforts. 124 They saw it as a way to “clothe
federal intervention on behalf of citizens’ rights with constitutional legitimacy.”125
That it had been little used until then was not a deterrent: Massachusetts Senator
Charles Sumner described it as “a sleeping giant . . . never until this recent war

120.
Id. at 110.
121.
See generally Robert M. Crea, Note, Racial Discrimination and Baker v. Carr,
30 J. LEGIS. 289, 292–300 (2004); E. Earl Parson & Monique McLaughlin, The Persistence
of Racial Bias in Voting: Voter ID, The New Battleground for Pretextual Race Neutrality, 8
J.L. & SOC. 75 (2007).
122.
See, e.g., Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 450.
123.
Bonfield, supra note 3, at 537–41 & nn.102–126.
124.
AMAR, BIOGRAPHY, supra note 10, at 372–76.
125.
ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–
1877, at 232 (1988); see also Mark D. Rosen, The Structural Constitutional Principle of
Republican Legitimacy, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371, 398 (2012) [hereinafter Rosen,
Structural].
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awakened, but it now comes forward with a giant’s power. . . . There is no other
clause which gives to Congress such supreme power over the states . . . .”126
Although this view was not unanimous and the path was not smooth,
Congress nonetheless relied on the Guarantee Clause, among other sources of
authority, to impose previously unheard-of requirements on the defeated confederate
states. Congress required the states that had rebelled to adopt universal male
suffrage, to convene new constitutional conventions, and to ratify the then-pending
Fourteenth Amendment. 127 Congress enforced these requirements by refusing to
seat those states’ congressional delegations unless and until the states complied—
the very type of enforcement of the Clause that the Supreme Court in Luther
anticipated. And based on the Guarantee Clause, Congress required Nebraska to
provide universal male suffrage as a condition of being admitted to the union. 128
This congressional activity—all of which took place before the ratification
of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments—thus relied on the Guarantee Clause
to vindicate one of the insights that led to the nationwide abolition of slavery in the
first place.129 “[M]uch happened ‘in the nation’s first eighty years to give rise to a
more robustly egalitarian and nationalist conception of republican government than
had prevailed in the 1780s.’”130 States owed to each other and to the nation a form
of government that met certain minimum criteria of democratic republicanism. Put
another way, the changed views about the tolerability of slavery within the Union
was part of a broader and ongoing shift in an understanding of the “structural

126.
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 614 (1867) (statement of Sen. Sumner),
quoted in FONER, supra note 125, at 232 & Bonfield, supra note 3, at 546.
127.
Bonfield, supra note 3, at 540–41.
128.
Id. at 541 & n.125 (citing 4 Stat. 391–92 (1867)).
129.
The Supreme Court did not have to decide whether to uphold the
Reconstruction-era legislation premised on the Guarantee Clause, although it suggested that
it would in dicta in Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 730–31 (1869).
130.
Rosen, Structural, supra note 125 (quoting AMAR, BIOGRAPHY, supra note 10,
at 370).
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principles” necessary to maintain the nation. 131 The subsequent ratification of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments reinforced that insight.132

131.
Balkin, Commerce, supra note 27, at 7. The Republicans argued that the
meaning of a republican form of government was “dynamic” and was not set at the time of
the Founding. Bonfield, supra note 3, at 542 & n.133 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d
Sess. 1254 (1870) (statement of Sen. Morton)). Morton argued also, similar to Justice Chase
in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798), that there were certain inalienable rights inherent
in a republican form of government: “equal civil rights, . . . protection to all, . . . no taking of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” Id.; see also id. at 542 n.133 (quoting
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1290 (1867) (statement of Rep. Mercur)) (arguing that in
interpreting the Clause, “‘the genius, ruling ideas, progress, and existing sentiments of the
great masses of the people’ must be accorded great deference”); id. at 543 & nn.134–35. But
see Williams, supra note 37, at 678–79 n.472 (suggesting that the public understanding of the
Guarantee Clause during Reconstruction was not clearly in support of universal suffrage).
Note also Justice Harlan’s partial dissent in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). There,
he argued that the Radical Republicans’ enthusiasm for universal Negro suffrage “cooled as
it ran into northern racial prejudice. At that time, only six States – Maine, New Hampshire,
Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New York – permitted Negroes to vote, and New
York imposed special property and residency requirements on Negro voters.” Id. at 156
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at 255–56 (opinion of
Brennan, J.) (making same points). And in 1865, the white electorate in Connecticut,
Wisconsin, Minnesota, Colorado (then a territory), and Washington, D.C. “roundly” defeated
“enfranchising proposals” in referenda. Id. at 157 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). And Justice Brennan noted that “Republicans suffered some severe
election setbacks in 1867 on account of their support of Negro suffrage.” Id. at 256 (opinion
of Brennan, J.). But see AMAR, BIOGRAPHY, supra note 10, at 372–76 (discussing republican
arguments for full enfranchisement in the South only).
132.
Cf. Bonfield, supra note 3, at 548; see also Smith, Awakening, supra note 53,
at 1988 (discussing Reconstruction era understandings that a republican form of government
was inconsistent with a system “‘where a large proportion of native-born citizens . . . is left
wholly unrepresented . . . ’”) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1865)
(statement of Sen. Sumner)). The full implications of those amendments, however, were (and
remain) contested. In Oregon v. Mitchell, for example, Justice Harlan argued that “[i]n the
historical context, no one could have understood [the Fourteenth Amendment] . . . as anything
other than an abandonment of the principle of Negro suffrage.” Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 162
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As a result, Justice Harlan claimed, the
Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment would not have understood that it would
disrupt “the States’ longstanding plenary control over voter qualifications.” Id. at 163. In
Harlan’s view, neither the Guarantee Clause nor the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed
universal suffrage. Id. at 201–202. If they did, all the subsequent voting rights amendments
would have been unnecessary. Id. But Justice Harlan’s read of the history was directly
contested by Justice Brennan, who concluded that:
the Amendment was framed by men who possessed differing views on the
great question of the suffrage and who, partly in order to formulate some
program of government and partly out of political expediency, papered
over their differences with the broad, elastic language of s 1 and left to
future interpreters of their Amendment the task of resolving in accordance
with future vision and future needs the issues that they left unresolved.
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III. NATIONHOOD, REPUBLICANISM, AND DEMOCRACY
Since the Civil War, Americans’ commitment to voting rights has
strengthened, although progress has not always been steady or linear, and our
identity as a democracy—and thus as a beacon of light for the world—has solidified.
Section A of this Part will address how to understand the Clause’s commitment to
republicanism today, in light of these developments. Section B will consider the
implications of other national changes. In the wake of the Civil War, “these United
States” became “the United States.” Increased mobility, massive migration, and ease
of communication and travel throughout the country have tightened the bonds
between citizens and the nation as a whole while diminishing the significance of
state-level loyalties. And American politics have nationalized. As a result, our
federalism is often tested horizontally, as legal and political developments in one
state are increasingly likely to have spillover effects in others.
A. Democratic Republicanism
As Parts I and II explained, from the beginning, republicanism incorporated
a commitment to representative government, leading, eventually, to the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments. But even before those amendments, African Americans
themselves demanded the vote as their right as citizens of a republic.133 During 1865,
for example, African Americans held statewide conventions throughout the South
at which speakers insisted upon “universal manhood suffrage,” relying on
“America’s republican traditions, especially the Declaration of Independence” and
echoing the language of the Guarantee Clause. 134 As Eric Foner explains, these
claims were not “merely familiar wording. . . . [T]he freedmen and Southern free
blacks saw emancipation as enabling the nation to live up to the full implications of
its republican creed – a goal that could be achieved only by . . . absorbing blacks
fully into the civil and political order.” 135 The philosophical and pragmatic
connections between universal suffrage and republicanism, while perhaps
contestable at the Founding, were widely recognized by the time of the Civil War,
including in the South.136
In the first years after the Civil War, African-American men registered and
voted in impressively large numbers. In 1868, the nationwide percentage of black
Id. at 274–75 (opinion of Brennan, J.); see also id. at 254–74 (setting out historical evidence).
As to the subsequent voting amendments, Justice Brennan provided a variety of practical
reasons why their proponents might have felt them important. Id. at 276–77.
133.
FONER, supra note 125, at 114.
134.
Id.
135.
Id.
136.
There is a tendency to refer to “the South” when describing the policies,
actions, and beliefs of white southerners who supported the machinery of white supremacy,
whether slavery, the Black Codes and Jim Crow, or violent terrorism against African
Americans. In fact, “the South” has always also included millions of African Americans who,
unsurprisingly, have held very different views. African Americans may not always have been
able to act as part of the polity and to express their views at the ballot box, but failing to
recognize that they too were part of the South gives us a skewed perspective on the opinions
and political beliefs of the people who lived there.
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men who had registered to vote was 80.5%, and in some southern states it was over
90%.137 “In the 1880 presidential election, estimated black turnout was 65 percent
or higher in North and South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.” 138 And
African Americans successfully elected many of their own to public office. 139
Not surprisingly, many white southerners resisted, and the federal
government eventually abandoned Reconstruction. 140 In the years that followed, two
significant developments undermined African Americans’ ability to participate in
politics in the South—a campaign of terrorism against them and a series of laws,
including poll taxes, literacy tests, and grandfather clauses, that prevented them from
registering to vote. 141 African-American voter turnout in the South fell to 2% in
1912.142 Ultimately, African Americans and other civil rights supporters marched
and died to make voting possible for black Americans who were long denied their
right to do so. In 1965, Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act to enforce the
commitments of the Fifteenth Amendment. 143
Even as white resistance to African-American political participation led to
massive denials of the right to vote in the South, however, a new national
commitment to universal suffrage was emerging. Americans have increasingly been
so unwilling to tolerate exclusions from voting that we have amended our
Constitution five times since Reconstruction to expand voting rights. The
Seventeenth Amendment eliminated state legislative selection of United States
Senators in favor of a popular vote; the Nineteenth Amendment granted women the
right to vote; the Twenty-third Amendment gave the District of Columbia electoral
votes for President; the Twenty-fourth Amendment eliminated poll taxes for federal
elections; and the Twenty-sixth Amendment lowered the national voting age to
18.144 In addition, the Supreme Court has invoked the Equal Protection Clause to
equalize voting rights and voting power, including by requiring legislative districts

137.
138.
139.

LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 20, at 89.
Id.
HENRY LOUIS GATES, JR., STONY THE ROAD: RECONSTRUCTION, WHITE
SUPREMACY, AND THE RISE OF JIM CROW 8 (2019).
140.
See LEMANN, supra note 15.
141.
Id.; Brad Epperly et al., Rule by Violence, Rule by Law: Lynching, Jim Crow,
and the Continuing Evolution of Voter Suppression in the U.S., PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS
(Mar. 24, 2019), https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592718003584; LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra
note 20, at 90–92.
142.
LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 20, at 92.
143.
Unfortunately, African Americans are still disproportionately excluded from
the franchise. See Epperly et al., supra note 141, at 9–10; infra Part IV.
144.
There have been a total of only 12 amendments since Reconstruction. In
addition to those listed in the text, the Sixteenth Amendment authorized a federal income tax;
the Eighteenth and Twenty-first Amendments imposed and then repealed Prohibition; the
Twentieth Amendment shortened the lame-duck period after federal elections; the Twentysecond imposed the two-term limit on presidents; the Twenty-fifth addressed presidential
succession and removal for incapacity; and the Twenty-seventh precludes salary increases for
members of Congress from going into effect until after a subsequent federal election.
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to be approximately equal in population in decisions that were remarkably popular
with the public.145
All of these expansions rest on an insistence that voting rights are important
enough to justify federal intrusion into state political structures and practices, and
they all hearken back to the original American commitment to representative selfgovernment. The voting rights amendments and other federal activity may have had
an unintended consequence for the Guarantee Clause, however. As a practical
matter, those Amendments have shifted public and academic focus from an
emphasis on republican democracy as a necessary condition for states’ peaceful and
long-term coexistence within one nation, to a focus on the protections the
Constitution provides for individuals; and from calls for congressional action to
judicial enforcement.146 That shift has obscured the significance of the Guarantee
Clause.
Nonetheless, to say that voting and democracy have dominated the
evolution of our constitutional commitments would be an understatement. “[B]y the
third quarter of the twentieth century, [Americans] had made democracy a going
concern for most, regardless of race or gender.” 147 Indeed, over time, American
national identity has become intimately connected to a belief in democracy, however
imperfect its execution. Presidents, for more than a century, have routinely invoked
democracy as America’s shining example to the world and our core commitment, or
what President Franklin Roosevelt called “our creed of liberty and democracy.” 148
145.
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL
OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE
MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 269–70 (2009) (describing public reaction to
reapportionment cases).
146.
See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 243–44 (2011) [hereinafter
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM] (arguing for distinctions between individualized or class-based
voting claims, to which the Equal Protection Clause easily applies, and claims concerning
“structural integrity and fairness of the political system,” better viewed through the lens of
the Guarantee Clause); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 118–19 n.* (1980) (discussing interaction of the Guarantee Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment); Rosen, Structural, supra note 125, at 378 (noting that the republicanism
“identifies legally significant facts that are overlooked by rights doctrines that focus primarily
on individuals”); id. at 421–28 (explaining why a structural guarantee of republicanism is
meaningfully different from individual rights); id. at 429–41 (explaining how the singular
focus on individual rights led the Supreme Court to fail to consider relevant information and
impact of the voter identification law challenged in Crawford v. Marion Co. Election Bd.,
553 U.S. 181 (2008), and the partisan gerrymandering challenged in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541
U.S. 267 (2004)); Smith, Awakening, supra note 53, at 1988; Williams, supra note 37, at 610–
11 (arguing that the Clause does not protect individual rights at all); Zafran, supra note 3, at
1420 (discussing limitations of courts addressing structural matters through an individualrights lens).
147.
GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 20, at 207.
148.
Praises Army Plan for Japanese Unit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1943, at 6, quoted
in Jared A. Goldstein, Unfit for the Constitution: Nativism and the Constitution, from the
Founding Fathers to Donald Trump, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 489, 491 (2018). The irony of
Roosevelt making this claim while issuing internment orders for Japanese Americans is
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In his 1905 inaugural address, for example, President Theodore Roosevelt,
reflecting on recent massive economic, social, and technological changes, raised
both warning and inspiration: “Never before have men tried so vast and formidable
an experiment as that of administering the affairs of a continent under the forms of
a Democratic republic.”149 He continued:
Upon the success of our experiment much depends, not only as
regards our own welfare, but as regards the welfare of mankind. If we
fail, the cause of free self-government throughout the world will rock
to its foundations, and therefore our responsibility is heavy, to
ourselves, to the world as it is to-day, and to the generations yet
unborn.150

Presidents have called on the American commitment to democracy in
wartime. Asking for congressional authority to send American troops to Europe
during World War I, President Woodrow Wilson famously declared that “[t]he
world must be made safe for democracy,” and trumpeted America’s special role in
doing so:
[W]e shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest
our hearts,—for democracy, for the right of those who submit to
authority to have a voice in their own Governments, for the fights and
liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a
concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations
and make the world itself at last free.151

A year before the attack on Pearl Harbor, President Franklin Roosevelt explained
the need to support and arm Britain and other Allies “to meet the threat to our
democratic faith.”152 President George W. Bush, nine days after 9/11, argued that
the United States was a target of terrorists because of our “democratically elected

emblematic of the reality that our country has frequently failed to live up to our stated ideals.
See generally, e.g., Goldstein, supra, at 531.
149.
Theodore Roosevelt, Inaugural Address of Theodore Roosevelt (Mar. 5,
1905), in AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/troos.asp.
150.
Id.
151.
Woodrow Wilson, Joint Address to Congress Leading to a Declaration of War
Against Germany (Apr. 2, 1917), in OUR DOCUMENTS, http://www.ourdocuments.gov/
doc.php?doc=61&page=transcript.
152.
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, The Arsenal of Democracy (Dec. 20, 1940), in
AMERICAN RHETORIC (updated Aug. 1, 2019), https://americanrhetoric.com/speeches/
fdrarsenalofdemocracy.html. This and other invocations of democracy led some on the right
to claim that the United States is not a democracy, but a republic, and some have continued
to make that claim, although it has been extensively debunked. See Steven L. Taylor, More
on “A Republic, Not a Democracy,” OUTSIDE THE BELTWAY (Aug. 29, 2019),
https://www.outsidethebeltway.com/more-on-a-republic-not-a-democracy/ (quoting Jamelle
Bouie, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Understands Democracy Better Than Republicans Do,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/27/opinion/aoc-crenshawrepublicans-democracy.html). The Framers’ understanding of republicanism required
representative democracy. See supra Sections I.A, I.B; Lessig, supra note 10.
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government.”153 And he relied on a promise of bringing democracy to the Middle
East to justify the Iraq invasion.154
These commitments and beliefs continue. Americans today believe that
they have a right to vote and that there is a basic one-person and one-vote principle.
According to the Pew Research Center, Americans overwhelmingly (83%) believe
that ensuring that no eligible voters are denied the opportunity to vote is “very
important” for American elections. 155 In recent years, Americans have made these
beliefs clear at the ballot box in states that allow constitutional amendments by
initiative. Voters in some states have created independent, nonpartisan or bipartisan
redistricting commissions.156 In 2018, Florida voters, by a supermajority, passed a
constitutional amendment to enfranchise ex-felons.157
As one scholar explains:
Ordinary Americans today broadly claim the rights to vote and to vote
equally, believe that these rights are theirs, and embody these beliefs
in routine practices that are nearly universally celebrated. These
rights have thus become. . .elements of proper republican government
– even if they were not so when the republican-government clause
. . . [was] written.158

Making sense of the Guarantee Clause today thus requires recognizing that
republicanism means something broader and more democratic than it did at the
153.
George W. Bush, Address to Joint Session of Congress Following 9/11
Attacks, AMERICAN RHETORIC (Sept. 20, 2001), https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/
gwbush911jointsessionspeech.htm.
154.
George W. Bush, Address on the Future of Iraq, AMERICAN RHETORIC (Feb.
26, 2003), https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/gwbushfutureofiraq2003.htm.
155.
The Public, the Political System and American Democracy, PEW RESEARCH
CTR. (April 26, 2018), http://www.people-press.org/2018/04/26/3-elections-in-the-u-spriorities-and-performance/. Americans are somewhat less sanguine about how well we live
up to this ideal, however, with only about two-thirds believing that the statement “no eligible
voters are denied the vote” describes our system very or somewhat well. Id.
156.
See, e.g., Redistricting Proposal Passes in Michigan, MICH. RADIO (Nov. 6,
2018), http://www.michiganradio.org/post/redistricting-proposal-passes-michigan; Annie
Lo, Citizen and Legislative Efforts to Reform Redistricting in 2018, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/current-citizen-effortsreform-redistricting.
157.
German Lopez, Florida Votes to Restore Ex-Felon Voting Rights with
Amendment 4, VOX (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/11/6/
18052374/florida-amendment-4-felon-voting-rights-results.
158.
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS
AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 196 (2012). In note 72, Amar goes on to say that “the basic
rights of adult American citizens to vote and to have their votes counted equally form part of
the actual lived experiences of ordinary persons, who go to the polls year after year expecting
these basic principles to be respected by government officials.” Id. at 551 n.72; see also
AMAR, BIOGRAPHY, supra note 10, at 370–76 (explaining the changing understanding of
republicanism during the first 80 years following ratification of the Constitution); BALKIN,
LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 146, at 241 (pointing out that states considered republican
at the Founding would not be considered so today).
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Founding.159 The Framers’ commitments to preclude despotism and to some form
of representative government remain vital. And in today’s world, those
commitments require universal citizenship suffrage 160 and general one-person, onevote principles—even as the details are often contested.161
B. One Nation, Indivisible
American commitment to national universal suffrage reflects our sense of
ourselves as a single democratic country. But it also reflects a national identity as a
single democratic country. In other words, democracy is central, but if we did not
have a national identity, there would be no particular need to require every state to
extend voting rights as the Constitution now provides. That national identity, in
contrast to many Americans’ Founding-era identification with their states, was—as
described in Part II—an impetus for the strengthened abolitionist movement and
eventually for the Civil War. But it developed still further in the post-Reconstruction
era with the massive changes that era experienced.
Significant demographic changes, for example, helped to spur a sense of
nationhood. The late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries saw vast increases in
immigration.162 “For the most part, these immigrants were coming not to New Jersey
or Nebraska but to America.”163 In the early twentieth century, the Great Migration
of African Americans from the rural South to Northern and Western cities created
family and cultural connections across hundreds of miles and between states in very
different parts of the country. All of these migrants tended to live in their own closeknit urban neighborhoods—albeit not necessarily by choice—but they were also
159.
See Smith, Awakening, supra note 53, at 1976 & nn.245–48 (citing Akhil Reed
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987), and Chisholm v. Georgia,
2 U.S. (4 Dall.) 419, 457 (1793) (Wilson, J., dissenting)); see also BALKIN, LIVING
ORIGINALISM, supra note 146, at 241 (“We must ask what the guarantees of representative
government and popular sovereignty mean today in our world.”); Akhil Reed Amar,
Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. Rev. 26, 51 (2000) [hereinafter
Amar, Foreword] (“We the People today must be expansive even if We the People at one
time were less so.”). As Rosen explains, “exclusions from the franchise that were acceptable
during the Founding Era would not be constitutional today.” Rosen, Structural, supra note
125, at 404. He argues that the Guarantee Clause, coupled with constitutional voting
provisions and amendments and years of custom, form “a structural principle of republican
legitimacy” and “together establish that the federal and state governments . . . . are ultimately
answerable to citizens.” Id. at 381; see also id. at 401–03 (explaining why Framers’
expectations about the scope of the Guarantee Clause should not be binding on the country
today).
160.
Interestingly, at the Founding, many states allowed noncitizens to vote. See
Virginia Harper-Ho, Non-Citizen Voting Rights: The History, the Law and Current Prospects
for Change, 18 L. & INEQ. 271, 273–75 (2000).
161.
See, e.g., Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1132–33 (2016) (concluding
that states are not required to rely on voting-eligible population in redistricting and declining
to decide whether they are allowed to do so). But see id. at 1133–42 (Thomas, J., concurring
in judgment) (arguing that the Constitution does not require one-person one-vote).
162.
FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 51, at 112.
163.
Id.
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“distributed among different states” and so did not “dominate any particular state
and give it a distinctly different character.”164 Both the internal migration of African
Americans and the vast immigration from abroad thus contributed heavily to a
citizenry that identified primarily as American and that had meaningful cross-state
connections.
Technology—notably the railroad, the steamboat, and the telegraph—
likewise facilitated an increased sense of national identity and increased assimilation
between Americans in different parts of the country, expanding technological trends
that had begun even before the Civil War. 165 And along with both the country’s
geographic spread and the technology to communicate and travel more efficiently
came increased national regulation, deemed necessary as commercial enterprises
spanned more than one state and so could not be effectively regulated at the state
level.166 The 1913 ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, allowing for a federal
income tax imposed “without apportionment among the several States,” added to
the federal government’s national reach and effectiveness. 167
The New Deal itself was both cause and consequence of the increasingly
nationalized economy. The increased regulatory authority of the federal government
has “made control of the federal government the central prize of US politics.” 168 The
New Deal’s public works projects, like electrification, helped bring “far-flung
communities, down to the littlest town or the remotest farm, into a national culture
. . . .”169 Radio, historian Jill Lepore argues “more than with any other technology
of communication, before or since, [gave] Americans . . . a sense of their shared
suffering, and shared ideals . . . .”170 The World Wars and the Cold War solidified
national pride, cohesion, and patriotism. 171
Today, and contrary to the Framers’ expectations, even as there are deep
divisions within American political culture, we have a much stronger sense of
national identity than Americans did at the time of the Founding. 172 Federalism
works differently today than at the Founding. Political divides tend to be more
rural/urban-suburban than state-to-state.173 This is not to say that Americans have
no reason or desire to identify with their states, but that they “identify far more

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
Id. at 112–13 (citing H.G. WELLS, THE OUTLINE OF HISTORY 1006 (1949)).
Id. at 112.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
DANIEL J. HOPKINS, THE INCREASINGLY UNITED STATES: HOW AND WHY
AMERICAN POLITICAL BEHAVIOR NATIONALIZED 131 (2018).
169.
Jill Lepore, The Last Time Democracy Almost Died, NEW YORKER (Jan. 27,
2020), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/02/03/the-last-time-democracy-almostdied.
170.
Id.
171.
HOPKINS, supra note 168, at 22.
172.
Id. at 4, 170–93.
173.
Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 111011 (2014).
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strongly with their country . . . than with subnational units . . . something that wasn’t
always true.”174
And such nationalization has significant political content. Between the
internet and national news networks, Americans can and do easily keep up with
national political news from around the country,175 while finding news about state
and local politics has become relatively increasingly difficult. 176 Americans are
increasingly likely to donate to campaigns across state lines, with only one-third of
itemized political contributions in 2012 going to candidates in the same state as the
donor.177 Americans travel to other states to volunteer for campaigns or to act as
nonpartisan poll watchers. And state and local races can become crucial events in
national movements. The recent election of several reformist prosecutors, such as
Larry Krasner of Philadelphia and Craig Watkins of Dallas, drew upon and in turn
will affect national criminal justice reform efforts. 178 Organizations across the
political spectrum develop and promote their policies in state legislatures around the
country.179
***
In this contemporary nationalized America, making sense of the Guarantee
Clause requires evaluating when and whether antidemocratic spillovers threaten our
national cohesion, our ability to draw on federalism as a strength, and our republican
democracy. A particular practice at a particular time and place might be
undemocratic or unfair to constituents, but its effects might be highly localized. The
same practice, under different circumstances, might not be. Part IV explores these
questions.

174.
HOPKINS, supra note 168, at 170.
175.
Id. at 127 (noting that contemporary news media provide much more
information to Americans about national politics than about state or local politics).
176.
Id. at 198; see also Charles Bethea, What Happens When the News Is Gone?,
NEW YORKER (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/the-future-of-democracy/
what-happens-when-the-news-is-gone.
177.
HOPKINS, supra note 168, at 61, 76–77. In 1990, the proportion of out-of-state
donations was only one-third. Id.; see also Bulman-Pozen, supra note 173, at 1035–36 &
nn.256–60 (documenting this trend). Bulman-Pozen also discusses whether states could
exclude residents of other states from participating in their elections, whether by prohibiting
out-of-state contributions and expenditures or imposing a residency requirement for petition
circulators. Id. at 1137–42. The courts have generally struck down such restrictions, with the
exception of an Alaska law imposing limits on nonresidents’ campaign contributions. See
State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 617 (Alaska 1999). But as she
documents, it is not entirely clear how such issues would be decided in the Supreme Court.
178.
Maya Wiley, Power of the Prosecutor: Reformer District Attorneys are
Changing Criminal Justice in Ways Legislatures Can’t, NEW REPUBLIC (May 24, 2018),
https://newrepublic.com/article/148305/reformer-district-attorneys.
179.
One of the best known is the American Legislative Exchange Council. See
ALEC, www.alec.org/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2019).
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IV. TODAY’S THREATS TO REPUBLICANISM
As a practical matter, even after the enactment of all the voting
amendments, American democracy has often been, at best, aspirational and, at
worst, illusory, especially for African Americans. And in addition to racial
exclusion, we can point to a rich history of incumbent and partisan entrenchment,
maintained through often unsavory and sometimes illegal means, including
patronage, malapportionment, extreme gerrymandering, exploitation of racial and
ethnic divisions, voter intimidation, and election fraud. 180 But although
entrenchment is part of our history, when taken to extremes, it challenges the very
foundation of a liberal constitutional democracy: “free and fair elections
characterized by the potential transfer of power.” 181 Alexander Hamilton would
agree. Explaining the Clause, he said: “The natural cure for an ill-administration, in
a popular or representative constitution, is a change of men. A guaranty by the
national authority would be as much levelled against the usurpations of rulers as
against the ferments and outrages of faction and sedition in the community.” 182 What
the framers might have called “rotation” 183—or the meaningful possibility of it—
was essential to protecting against the despotic entrenchment they feared.
When and whether such entrenchment gives rise to Guarantee Clause
concerns, however, is a highly contextual, historically contingent question. 184
180.
See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 274–75 (2004) (plurality opinion);
Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE
L.J. 1287, 1302-03 (1982); Crea, supra note 121; Heller, supra note 37; Parson &
McLaughlin, supra note 121; Zafran, supra note 3.
181.
GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 20, at 10. Ginsburg and Huq argue that a serious
danger of democratic erosion arises when there is “decay in the three basic predicates of
democracy—competitive elections, liberal rights to speech and association, and the rule of
law.” Id. at 43. The rule of law includes the neutral, expert, and nonpartisan administration of
elections and redistricting. Id. at 13. And they explain that a party seeking to entrench itself
may well:
politicize the selection of judicial, bureaucratic, and prosecutorial offices
that are supposed to be insulated from partisan conflict. It might do so with
an eye to using those elements of the state to entrench itself even further
against political competition, as well as more simply to further favored
policy ends. For example, in the vast majority of democracies,
appointments to the judiciary involve some insulation from direct control
of the executive branch. . . . But these formal, arms-length structures can
themselves be manipulated, and a party that seeks to extend its control
over all branches of government will be motivated to do so.
Id. at 85. While they do not appear to believe that the United States is on the verge of losing
our commitment to “liberal rights to speech and association,” they do worry about decay in
the other two axes and they appear to believe that such decay is cause for significant concern
about the health of our democracy. Id. at 44.
182.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, supra note 37.
183.
JOHN ADAMS, THOUGHTS ON GOVERNMENT (1776), https://wisc.pb.unizin.org/
adef20172018/chapter/1-2-john-adams-thoughts-on-government/.
184.
See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 146, at 243–44 (discussing
entrenchment as a natural danger of democratic government and identifying the Guarantee
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Section A reviews current scholarship about the norms, practices, and structures
needed to preserve meaningful democracy and about the threats to democracy that
we see today. Section B explains why such threats have negative spillover effects
from one state to another, effects that states cannot protect themselves against.
Effective protection can only come from the federal government, as promised by the
Guarantee Clause.
A. Democratic Erosion in Theory and Practice
With the election of President Donald Trump and challenges to democracy
observed worldwide, there has been a not-so-small explosion of books and articles
diagnosing and decrying the possible demise of democracy. 185 This work provides a
valuable frame for evaluating when a particular practice or, more accurately, a
constellation of practices gives rise to broader concerns for the health of republican
self-government. One of the key insights of this work is that preventing what Tom
Ginsburg and Aziz Huq call “democratic erosion” requires both gracious losing and
gracious winning. Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt identify two key related norms
essential to a healthy democracy: “mutual toleration, or the understanding that
competing parties see each other as legitimate rivals, and forbearance, or the idea
that politicians should exercise restraint in deploying their institutional
prerogatives.”186 Ginsburg and Huq operationalize these norms’ role in the central
characteristic of a functioning democracy: “the possibility of one coalition turning
power over to another.” 187 Both sets of authors explain that without mutual
toleration and forbearance, the winning party will have both ideological and
electoral incentives to play “constitutional hardball” by putting in place policies that
will make it that much harder for their opponents to retake power in the future. And
knowing that might happen, any party in power has an incentive to do the same,
leading to a spiral of antidemocratic actions.188 Put another way, “orderly exit [from
power] rests upon the belief that one will have voice in the new arrangements and
hence can live to fight another day,”189 but “constitutional hardball lends itself to
retaliation and escalation.”190
Such escalation is particularly likely when extreme partisan polarization
erodes the vital norms of forbearance and mutual legitimacy. “[W]hen societies
grow so deeply divided that parties become wedded to incompatible worldviews,
Clause as protection against it); Zafran, supra note 3, at 1445–55 (arguing that courts should
adjudicate Guarantee Clause challenges to entrenchment and partisan lock-up).
185.
See generally, e.g, LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 20; GINSBURG & HUQ,
supra note 20; Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, 118
COLUM. L. REV. 915 (2018) [hereinafter Fishkin & Pozen, Asymmetric Hardball]; Browning,
supra note 20.
186.
LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 20, at 8–9; see also id. at 102–17 (explaining
these concepts in more detail); Fishkin & Pozen, Asymmetric Hardball, supra note 185, at
922–27.
187.
GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 20, at 11.
188.
LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 20, at 112.
189.
GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 20, at 11.
190.
Fishkin & Pozen, Asymmetric Hardball, supra note 185, at 927.
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and especially when their members are so socially segregated that they rarely
interact, stable partisan rivalries eventually give way to perceptions of mutual
threat.”191 Such perceptions lead “parties [to] view one another as mortal enemies,”
which means that “the stakes of political competition heighten dramatically,”
undermining the normal operation of democratic give-and-take:
Losing ceases to be a routine and accepted part of the political process
and instead becomes a full-blown catastrophe. When the perceived
cost of losing is sufficiently high, politicians will be tempted to
abandon forbearance. Acts of constitutional hardball may then in turn
further undermine mutual toleration, reinforcing beliefs that our
rivals pose a dangerous threat.192

And as democracy scholars warn, along with such polarization comes an increasing
unwillingness to compromise—a straightforward application of the notion that when
parties become “wedded to incompatible world views,” ordinary democratic
methods of resolving disputes become much more fraught. 193
It is no secret that we are in an era of such extreme polarization. 194 Political
scientists have documented that while at one time there were Democratic members
of Congress who were more conservative than some Republicans, that is no longer
191.
LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 20, at 116; see also id. at 9 (arguing that
“extreme polarization can kill democracies”); id. at 112 (explaining vicious cycle of mistrust
and constitutional hardball); GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 20, at 209 (making same point);
Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Constitutional Hardball vs. Beanball: Identifying
Fundamentally Antidemocratic Tactics, 119 COLUM. L. REV. FORUM (2019),
https://columbialawreview.org/content/hardball-vs-beanball-identifying-fundamentallyantidemocratic-tactics/ (arguing that some forms of hardball are so fundamentally
antidemocratic that “it breaks [the] basic rules[—]to eliminate the other players from the
game,” and labelling this antidemocratic hardball as beanball); Joseph Fishkin & David E.
Pozen, Evaluating Constitutional Hardball: Two Fallacies and a Research Agenda, 119
COLUM. L. REV. FORUM No. 5 (2019), https://columbialawreview.org/content/evaluatingconstitutional-hardball-two-fallacies-and-a-research-agenda/ (agreeing with conceptual
distinction between hardball and beanball).
192.
LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 20, at 112; see also GINSBURG & HUQ, supra
note 20, at 90 (“When each side of a bilaterally divided nation perceives the other side as
extreme and imperiling its very existence, politics can assume a zero-sum character.”).
193.
LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 20, at 116. There is evidence that our current
polarization is asymmetric in that Republicans have moved further to the right than Democrats
have moved to the left and that, along with that shift, Republicans are less willing to
compromise than are Democrats. Fishkin & Pozen, Asymmetric Hardball, supra note 185, at
940 & n.103; GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 20, at 126–27. If so, that difference between the
parties may explain why we may currently see more examples of Republicans engaging in
the norm-breaking behaviors that endanger democracy than of Democrats. See Shugerman,
supra note 191 (arguing that Republicans are significantly more aggressive in their use of
constitutional hardball and beanball than are Democrats). But neither party is pure, and the
danger of escalation is ever-present.
194.
THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS:
HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF
EXTREMISM 56–57 (paperback ed. 2016), cited in Fishkin & Pozen, Asymmetric Hardball,
supra note 185, at 940 & n.102.
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true. 195 And the polarization is not limited to professional politicians. The Pew
Research Center reports that since 1994, “the gaps [between Republicans and
Democrats] on several sets of political values in particular – including measures of
attitudes about the social safety net, race and immigration – have increased
dramatically.”196 Fewer than half of Americans appear to favor political
compromise.197 Nearly half of Democrats and Republicans alike view the opposing
party as “a threat to the nation.” 198 Such rhetoric is ubiquitous, especially by
President Trump. In but one of many examples, President Trump’s speech formally
announcing his reelection campaign, he excoriated Democrats as “look[ing] down
with hatred on our values and with utter disdain for the people whose lives they want
to run” and calling “the Democratic position on immigration . . . ‘the greatest
betrayal of the American middle class and, frankly, American life.’”199
Republicans and Democrats increasingly live in different places, with
Republicans in more rural areas and Democrats in cities and suburbs, 200 and
increasingly large numbers of survey respondents indicate that they would not want
their children to marry across party lines. 201 More broadly, those who identify with
the different parties appear to have “competing narratives about triumphs and
challenges in all realms of public life – the economic, the social, the moral.” 202
As democracy scholars would predict, this kind of polarization appears to
be creating an unwillingness to accept the possibility of electoral loss. This
unwillingness translates into concrete actions designed to diminish the electoral

195.
HOPKINS, supra note 168, at 133 (summarizing research); The Polarization of
the Congressional Parties, VOTEVIEW (Jan. 30, 2016), https://legacy.voteview.com/
political_polarization_2015.htm.
196.
HOPKINS, supra note 168, at 134 (describing scholarly disagreement over the
extent to which polarization is primarily an elite phenomenon but noting “widespread
agreement that voters are more sorted by ideology than in prior decades, with conservatives
overwhelmingly defining themselves as Republicans and liberals as Democrats”); The
Partisan Divide on Political Values Grows Even Wider, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 7, 2017),
http://www.people-press.org/2017/10/05/the-partisan-divide-on-political-values-growseven-wider/.
197.
The Public, the Political System and American Democracy, PEW RESEARCH
CTR. (April 26, 2018), http://www.people-press.org/2018/04/26/8-the-tone-of-politicaldebate-compromise-with-political-opponents/.
198.
Emily Badger & Niraj Chokshi, How We Became Bitter Political Enemies,
N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (June 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/15/upshot/how
-we-became-bitter-political-enemies.html.
199.
Maggie Haberman, Annie Karni & Michael D. Shear, Trump, at Rally in
Florida, Kicks Off His 2020 Re-election Bid, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/18/us/politics/donald-trump-rally-orlando.html.
200.
See BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED
AMERICA IS TEARING US APART (2009).
201.
Lynn Vavreck, A Measure of Identity: Are You Wedded to Your Party?, N.Y.
TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/upshot/are-youmarried-to-your-party.html.
202.
Bulman-Pozen, supra note 173, at 1114.
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strength of the opposing party. Many of these actions have been extensively
discussed and analyzed elsewhere; what follows is only a summary.
1. Extreme Partisan Gerrymandering
Extreme partisan gerrymandering can allow one party to maintain control
over a legislature (or a congressional delegation) even if it receives significantly less
than a majority of votes cast. In Wisconsin, for example, in the 2018 midterm
election, Democratic candidates for the State Assembly received 53% of the
votes.203 Republicans, however, won 63 of the 99 Assembly seats. 204 Other states,
and both parties, are responsible for similar stories, including Republicans in North
Carolina, and Democrats in Maryland.205
Of course, parties and politicians have long used redistricting as a political
tool designed to entrench power. The word “gerrymander” itself dates back to 1812
when Massachusetts Governor Eldridge Gerry approved a redistricting map that
favored his party—and that included a district that was shaped like a salamander.206
What sets apart today’s gerrymandering, however, is its effectiveness.
Technology—in particular, high-powered analysis of detailed data about voters and
highly sophisticated mapping software—allows a party in control of districting to
guarantee itself a legislative majority not just in the next one or two elections but
well beyond that207—possibly even as long as until the next redistricting cycle. In
some states, parties in control of redistricting can also redistrict their state
legislatures repeatedly during the course of a decade.208 Thus, a party can perpetuate
its legislative control long after it has lost popular support. 209 And the Supreme

203.
Lieb, supra note 16.
204.
Id.
205.
See Newkirk, supra note 17; Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484
(2019).
206.
Greg Miller, The Map That Popularized the Word ‘Gerrymander,’ NAT’L GEO.
(Nov.
6,
2018),
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/06/map-gerrymanderredistricting-history-newspaper/.
207.
See,
e.g.,
Jacob
Eisler, Partisan
Gerrymandering
and
the
Constitutionalization of Statistics, 68 EMORY L.J. 979, 992 (2019) (discussing techniques to
make partisan gerrymandering much more durable).
208.
See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 412–13
(2006) (plurality opinion) (describing off-cycle redistricting in Texas); Justin Levitt, Intent Is
Enough: Invidious Partisanship in Redistricting, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1993, 2051 n.158
(2018) (describing “jurisdictions without temporal limits on redistricting, in which a
legislative majority may redraw lines to fine-tune partisan advantage as often as they have the
intestinal fortitude to do so”) (citing Justin Levitt & Michael P. McDonald, Taking the “Re”
out of Redistricting: State Constitutional Provisions on Redistricting Timing, 95 GEO.
L.J. 1247, 1258–60, 1262–64, 1266 (2007)).
209.
Jordan Ellenberg, How Computers Turned Gerrymandering into a Science,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/opinion/sunday/computers
-gerrymandering-wisconsin.html; Newkirk, supra note 17; see also BALKIN, LIVING
ORIGINALISM, supra note 146, at 243–44 (arguing that the Guarantee Clause is designed to
ensure majority rule).
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Court has decided that the federal judiciary has no role to play in addressing these
activities.210
2. Lame-Duck Lawmaking
The antidemocratic consequences of extreme partisan gerrymandering—
and its contributions to an antidemocratic spiral—have been particularly evident in
the recent post-election conduct of legislators in heavily gerrymandered states. In
the 2018 general election in Wisconsin, for example, the Democratic candidates for
governor and attorney general won and a majority of voters chose Democratic state
legislators, but, as already noted, the gerrymandered legislature remained in
Republican control.211 During the lame-duck session, while the defeated Republican
governor remained in office, the legislature passed a series of laws removing power
from the governor and attorney general, including preventing the incoming officials
from keeping their campaign promises to withdraw from a lawsuit challenging the
Affordable Care Act, and scaling back the governor’s appointment power. 212 And
Republican legislative leaders expressed the kind of contempt for voters of the other
party that democracy scholars warn about. 213 Similar disempowering laws were
passed by North Carolina’s Republican-controlled legislature in 2016, after
Democratic candidates were elected as governor and attorney general. 214
3. Voter Suppression
Voter suppression, like gerrymandering, has a long and even less illustrious
history. Long a technique to prevent African Americans from voting or even
registering to vote in the South, it has become more sophisticated. 215 Some states
have imposed voter identification requirements that disproportionately affect voters
210.
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2498–2508.
211.
Lieb, supra note 16.
212.
Mitch Smith & Monica Davey, Wisconsin Republicans Defiantly Move to
Limit the Power of Incoming Democrats, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/05/us/wisconsin-power-republicans.html.
213.
Speaker of the Wisconsin Statehouse Robin Vos explained that “[i]f you took
Madison and Milwaukee out of the state election formula, we would have a clear majority.”
Emily Badger, Are Rural Voters the ‘Real’ Voters? Wisconsin Republicans Seem to Think So,
N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/06/upshot/
wisconsin-republicans-rural-urban-voters.html. Senate Majority Leader Scott Fitzgerald
similarly claimed that the Republican-led legislature is “closest to those we represent,” unlike
the “incoming administration that is based almost solely in Madison.” Id.; see also GINSBURG
& HUQ, supra note 20, at 72–73 (describing antidemocratic mechanism of dismissing some
voters as not fully part of the polity).
214.
GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 20, at 161, 241; LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra
note 20, at 208–12 (documenting events in North Carolina); Maggie Astor, Wisconsin,
Limiting Governor, Borrows a Page From North Carolina’s Book, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/05/us/politics/wisconsin-governor-legal-challenge
.html.
215.
See Dana Milbank, The Election Really Was Rigged, WASH. POST (Nov. 29,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-election-really-was-rigged/2016/11/
29/c2ed58d8-b666-11e6-a677-b608fbb3aaf6_story.html (describing extensive voter
suppression efforts).
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who are more likely to vote for Democrats than Republicans. 216 There is ample
evidence that that disproportionate effect is, for many of the legislators supporting
these requirements, a primary reason to enact them. When the Wisconsin legislature
enacted new voter identification laws (“voter ID laws”) in 2011, for example, one
Republican legislative aide reported that “‘GOP Senators were giddy’ about the way
a proposed voter ID bill ‘literally singled out the prospects of suppressing minority
and college voters.’”217 In North Carolina, the legislature cut back on early voting,
targeting “with almost surgical precision” the times and places most likely to be
used by African American voters.218
4. Election Maladministration
There are increasing complaints that polling places in Democratic
neighborhoods are disproportionately closed, that voting machines are unfairly
distributed making very long wait times in some places but not in others, that voting
machines are sometimes inoperable or delivered without essential ancillary
equipment, and that early voting is restricted in targeted ways.219 Moreover, some
of the decisions about how to conduct elections—like how to distribute voting
machines, for example—and the nuts and bolts of doing so—like actually getting
the machines to the right places and in working order—are overseen by partisan
officials, sometimes engaged in their own campaigns, raising the suspicion that they
use their offices for partisan advantage rather than to ensure free and fair elections. 220

216.
Michael Wines, Some Republicans Acknowledge Leveraging Voter ID Laws
for Political Gain, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/17/us/
some-republicans-acknowledge-leveraging-voter-id-laws-for-political-gain.html.
217.
CAROL ANDERSON, ONE PERSON, NO VOTE: HOW VOTER SUPPRESSION IS
DESTROYING OUR DEMOCRACY 64 & n.77 (2018) [hereinafter ANDERSON, ONE PERSON]
(quoting Wines, supra note 216).
218.
N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214 (4th Cir.
2016).
219.
Amy Gardner and Beth Reinhard, Broken Machines, Rejected Ballots and
Long Lines: Voting Problems Emerge as Americans Go to the Polls, WASH. POST (Nov. 6,
2018 5:42 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/broken-machines-rejected-ballotsand-long-lines-voting-problems-emerge-as-americans-go-to-the-polls/2018/11/06/ffd11e52dfa8-11e8-b3f0-62607289efee_story.html?utm_term=.042fd32cc226. One reason these
complaints are increasing is the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder, 570
U.S. 529 (2013). In Shelby County, the Court effectively struck down the requirement of
Section Five of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) that some jurisdictions preclear any voting
or election-related changes with the Federal Department of Justice or the D.C. District Court.
(Technically, the Court struck down the “coverage formula” set out in a different section of
the VRA, leaving section five intact but inapplicable to any jurisdictions.) Many of the
practices described in the text would have been prohibited under the preclearance regime
because they have a disproportionate impact on racial minorities.
220.
In Georgia’s most recent gubernatorial election, for example, Secretary of
State Brian Kemp was also the Republican candidate for governor. Kemp was accused of
engaging in a host of antidemocratic practices, including holding up the processing of new
citizens’ voter registrations and misallocating voting machines. Carol Anderson, Brian
Kemp’s Lead in Georgia Needs an Asterisk, ATLANTIC (Nov. 7, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/11/georgia-governor-kemp-abrams/
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***
To the extent that these laws and actions are designed to entrench one party
or certain politicians in power, some of their contributions to the antidemocratic
spiral are obvious. As the same Republican aide quoted above explained, “Think
about that for a minute. Elected officials planning and happy to help deny a fellow
American’s constitutional right to vote in order to increase their own chances to
hang onto power.”221 This attitude is the kind of unwillingness to accept or allow
electoral loss, and failure to engage in forbearance, that democracy scholars warn
about.
The tactics may have additional antidemocratic effects. Supporters of voter
ID laws, for example, often rely on claims of widespread in-person voter fraud—
claims that have repeatedly been debunked—to generate public, and judicial,
support for them.222 Ordinary people who hear the claims of voter fraud, especially
when they hear those claims from politicians and commentators who share their
world view, are likely to distrust the integrity of election results they don’t like. 223
In other words, the claims add to the likelihood that Republican voters will view
Democrats as lacking a legitimate claim to power. 224 It works the other way as well.
For those unable to vote due to voter ID laws, or for those whose side loses voters—
generally Democrats—those laws also have the potential to delegitimize election
results by creating a belief that Republicans win only by preventing people from
voting. 225 It is hard to imagine a better way to undermine mutual tolerance.
575095/. Kemp prevailed in a very tight election. His opponent, Stacie Abrams, and her allies
have filed a lawsuit challenging numerous aspects of Georgia’s voting and election practices
as violating the Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause. Vanessa Williams,
Lawsuit by Abrams PAC Continues Debate over Voter Suppression in Bitter Georgia
Governor’s Race, WASH. POST (Nov. 29, 2018, 9:29 AM), https://www.washington
post.com/politics/lawsuit-alleges-voter-suppression-in-bitter-georgia-governors-race-andseeks-protections-for-future-races/2018/11/29/750afc20-f353-11e8-aeea-b85fd44449f5_
story.html.
221.
Wines, supra note 216. This aide left his job due to this experience. Id.
222.
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 191–96 (2008)
(upholding Indiana’s voter identification law in part due to state’s asserted interest in
preventing voter fraud and safeguarding public confidence despite lack of any evidence of
such fraud in Indiana); ANDERSON, ONE PERSON, supra note 217, at 55, 63–66.
223.
See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 173, at 1113 (explaining that partisanship
effects how people process information); Ross Ramsey, Analysis: What do Texas Voters
Want? Meat and Potatoes, Apparently. And Cleaner Elections, TEXAS TRIB. (June 21, 2019),
https://www.texastribune.org/2019/06/21/texas-voters-split-trump-fear-elections-are-riggedpoll-says/ (contrasting concerns about elections amongst Texas Democrats and Republicans).
224.
See Ariel Malka & Yphtach Lelkes, In a New Poll, Half of Republicans Say
They Would Support Postponing the 2020 Election if Trump Proposed It, WASH. POST (Aug.
10, 2017, 2:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/08/10/
in-a-new-poll-half-of-republicans-say-they-would-support-postponing-the-2020-election-iftrump-proposed-it/ (noting, among other alarming findings, that nearly half of Republicans
believed that Trump won the popular vote in 2016).
225.
See, e.g., Parson & McLaughlin, supra note 121, at 100–03; Leonard Pitts, Jr.,
Republicans Cheated to Win, and We All Lost, MIAMI HERALD (Nov. 20, 2018, 4:46 PM),
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Likewise, if allegations of biased election administration are true, such manipulation
is an example of attempts to undermine free and fair elections. If they are not, the
mere appearance of this kind of antidemocratic conduct with no meaningful way to
check it might itself undermine many people’s faith in elections and in the
democratic process more generally, possibly making them less likely to participate
and less likely to acknowledge the winners as legitimate.
Many, possibly most, of these entrenchment efforts are currently legal or
constitutional. 226 Many, like gerrymandering and voter suppression, have a long
history, although they are intimately connected to our history of racist exclusion
from the franchise.227 But the insights of comparative law, history, and politicalscience scholars warn us not to look at these practices—and others not cataloged
here—in isolation or out of their larger political context, or to rely on formal legality,
when evaluating threats to democracy. “Because erosion occurs piecemeal, it
necessarily involves many incremental changes to legal regimes and institutions.
Each of these changes may be innocuous or defensible in isolation. It is only by their
cumulative effect that erosion occurs.”228
B. Evaluating Spillovers
To the extent that partisan gerrymandering, voter suppression, and other
antidemocratic tactics lock into power a particular party or faction, they arguably
create the kind of pseudo-monarchy or aristocracy that the Framers worried about. 229
But antidemocratic practices in some states need not rise to the level of despotism
to cause serious negative spillover effects in others, and in fact, they work to
undermine some of federalism’s greatest strengths.
The simplest such spillovers arise from the contagious nature of
antidemocratic tactics. As Ginsburg and Huq explain: “We live in an era of easy and
https://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/opn-columns-blogs/leonard-pitts-jr/article
221971770.html.
226.
See, e.g., Crawford, 553 U.S. at 181 (upholding Indiana’s voter identification
law).
227.
See generally Crea, supra note 121.
228.
GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 20, at 45; see also id. at 80, 91; LEVITSKY &
ZIBLATT, supra note 20, at 8, 77–96 (exploring specific examples of this phenomenon);
Fishkin & Pozen, Asymmetric Hardball, supra note 185, at 922 (quoting Curtis A. Bradley &
Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions, and the Judicial Separation of
Powers, 105 GEO. L.J. 255, 266 (2017)) (describing “constitutional hardball” in part as
aggressive and disruptive tactics that may be technically permissible but that “put pressure on
the ‘norms of good institutional citizenship’ that help to structure and ‘sustain the
constitutional system’”).
229.
Cf. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 146, at 243 (arguing that “[t]he
goal of the guarantee clause is to protect popular sovereignty; . . . to ensure that majorities
rule and present aristocracy or oligarchy, whether the aristocracy or oligarchy is due to birth,
concentration of economic power, or the result of political machination”); LEVITSKY &
ZIBLATT, supra note 20, at 108 (explaining why the longstanding norm of president serving
no more than two terms was critical to “our republican system”) (quoting House Resolution
in Bruce Peabody, George Washington, Presidential Term Limits, and the Problem of
Reluctant Political Leadership, 31 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 402 (2001)).
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rapid legal borrowing and transplantation across jurisdictions. . . . Bad ideas can
spread as quickly as good ones . . . Democratic erosion is one example of this.” 230
They elaborate: “Patterns of diffusion, whereby policies and institutions adopted in
one state can spread to others, need not differentiate between pro- and
antidemocratic content. One can imagine, for example, institutional innovations,
such as restrictions on the ballot or hardwired partisan gerrymanders, spreading
around the country . . . .”231
Such anti-democratic spillovers present a different kind of threat to
federalism than do spillovers that arise from policy differences, like disagreements
over whether to legalize marijuana or different levels of environmental regulation. 232
Such policy spillovers of course generate friction, which many federalism scholars
see as inherently problematic. 233 Others, including leading scholar Heather Gerken,
argue that such policy-based spillover effects often create a positive friction that
moves debates into the political sphere and forces political discussion and
compromise.234 For one thing, spillovers force an “everyday practice of pluralism,”
where citizens of different states have to tolerate their neighbors’ different views
and different laws. 235 But spillovers are less likely to lead to such positive
developments where those already messy political processes are distorted by
antidemocratic tactics. Citizens of one state are much less likely to tolerate policy
spillovers if they believe that the neighboring states are distorting the democratic
processes that produce those policies.
Indeed, Gerken argues that the focus of federalism scholars should largely
be on whether “the right conditions of federal-state bargaining obtain.”236 The point
here is not that citizens of one state have any right to interfere with the politics and
policy preferences of another state under normal circumstances. 237 Rather, because
federalism is messy, as is politics, we have an interest in having what Gerken calls
the “right conditions for federal-state bargaining” present in all states.238 For those
conditions to obtain nationally, however, states should not be able to distort their
relative power nationally by means of state-level entrenchment. Indeed, consistent
with my reading of the Guarantee Clause, Fred Smith argues that the Clause is a
230.
GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 20, at 73.
231.
Id. at 149. As Ginsburg and Huq explain, federalism “cannot supply a reliable
safeguard against erosion, and it is a deep mistake to celebrate or condemn it in an unthinking
or categorical fashion.” Id. at 150.
232.
See generally, e.g., Kristen H. Engel, State Environmental Standard Setting:
Is There a “Race” and Is it “To the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997) (discussing ways
that states’ environmental regulation impacts other states).
233.
See Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 21, at 61–62 (discussing such concerns).
234.
See id. at 78–97.
235.
Gerken & Dawson, supra note 21; see also Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note
21, at 88; Gerken, Taft Lecture, supra note 21, at 395.
236.
Heather K. Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a Détente?, 59 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 997, 1030 (2015) [hereinafter Gerken, Détente].
237.
See Heller, supra note 37, at 1760 (distinguishing between constitutional
matters and ordinary substantive law).
238.
Gerken, Détente, supra note 236, at 1030.
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bulwark against precisely such power distortion. He argues that the Clause protects
what he calls “state integrity,” which includes “existence, stability, and parity,”
providing a “method to protect states from becoming significantly weaker or
stronger than their neighbors.”239
Yet an entrenched but unrepresentative government can lead to precisely
such distortions. There can be a gerrymandering cascade effect, for example, when
a gerrymandered state legislature draws gerrymandered congressional districts.
Voter suppression can likewise affect the make-up of the House of Representatives,
as well as the outcome of Senate and Presidential elections. And since members of
Congress in heavily gerrymandered “safe” seats are less likely to be willing to
compromise or work across the aisle, this gerrymandering cascade not only feeds
into the antidemocratic spiral described by scholars, but it affects the entire
functioning of the national government—by definition a spillover effect. 240
Other concrete effects on national governance are plausible if still
unrealized. Extreme partisan gerrymandering of state legislatures could lead to a call
for a national constitutional convention—and ratification of amendments or even an
entirely new constitution—on terms dictated by only one party and without the
widespread democratic support that any such changes should enjoy. 241 Or consider
what would happen if a presidential race were thrown to the House. The Twelfth
Amendment provides that where no candidate receives a majority of the presidential
electors’ votes, the House decides the election—with each state entitled to a single
vote. Extreme partisan gerrymandering might well control partisan control of the
different state delegations, as it does with North Carolina and Wisconsin, which
would then determine the outcome of the election. 242 These outcomes may not be
likely, but they are certainly plausible, and those who study democracy warn against
ignoring the unlikely but plausible.
Dysfunctional state-level democracies can also impede another central
value of federalism—the development and implementation of alternative policies
and practices. One view of federalism is that states “check the federal government”
239.
Smith, Awakening, supra note 53, at 1951 (emphasis added).
240.
See Fishkin & Pozen, Asymmetric Hardball, supra note 185, at 945–51
(explaining that Republican members of Congress in overwhelmingly Republican districts
have increasingly been threatened by primary challenges from the right, making moderation
and compromise politically hazardous).
241.
See Carolyn Shapiro, Gerrymandering the Constitution: More than Statehouse
Politics at Risk, HILL (Oct. 1, 2017, 12:20 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/353283gerrymandering-the-constitution-theres-more-than-just-statehouses-at-risk. Indeed, such a
convention is the explicit goal of many on the political right. See, e.g., Joan Walsh, The 7.383Seat Strategy, NATION (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-7383-seatstrategy/; see also GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 20, at 139–40 (playing out a version of this
scenario with a special emphasis on how the resulting constitutional amendments might be
antidemocratic); id. at 206 (explaining that there is “no way to insulate against the risk that a
convention would be captured by antidemocratic forces”).
242.
Cf. Norm Ornstein, What Happens If the 2020 Election Is a Tie?, ATLANTIC
(July 11, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/07/what-happens-if-2020election-tie/593608/.
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in part “by formulating opposing policies and putting them into practice.” 243 On this
view, the states are a kind of proving ground not only for the purpose of
experimenting to identify potentially superior policies, but also for the purpose of
developing platforms on which the parties can run. 244 If the states’ democratic
processes are undermined, however, that policy development may well be stymied.
And dysfunctional democracies can also distort the role that states play in
implementing, challenging, and developing national policy. Governors and state
legislatures, together or separately, may have extraordinary power to embrace,
implement, resist, seek waivers from, or otherwise interact with federal law that
requires or allows state implementation—which is a significant amount of federal
law.245 Consider how different the ongoing debate about the Affordable Care Act
would be if no states had rejected the law’s Medicaid expansion. Or consider the
role marijuana legalization is having on national drug policy. 246 And state attorneys
general can have even more immediate effects on nationwide policy than can
governors and state legislatures. In recent years, state attorneys general have been
challenging federal policy in court with increasing frequency, sometimes obtaining
nationwide injunctions.247 When an attorney general obtains a nationwide injunction
against a federal regulation, that certainly affects the interests of citizens in other
states.
On the other side, functioning democratic practices and institutions in
different states can have positive and prodemocratic spillover effects. More robust
political responsiveness at the state level may well foster stronger state governments,
increased political involvement, and more faith in the democratic process. 248 That in
turn can have positive effects on citizens’ general willingness to see their political
opponents as legitimate and to engage in forbearance when they have governmental
control. Put another way, robust democracy at the state and local level can give
people the practice and experience necessary to accept that they will sometimes be
on the losing side of elections. And increased state and local government

243.
Bulman-Pozen, supra note 173, at 1089.
244.
Id. at 1089–90.
245.
See, e.g., Miriam Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, 131 HARV. L. REV.
483, 485–86 (2017); Gerken, Détente, supra note 236, at 1010–11.
246.
Gerken, Détente, supra note 236, at 1014.
247.
See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018); Texas v. United States,
945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019). See also PAUL NOLETTE, FEDERALISM ON TRIAL: STATE
ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND NATIONAL POLICYMAKING IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 168–95
(2015). State attorneys general also influence national policy by suing nongovernment actors.
See, e.g., id. at 22–30 (discussing growth of state litigation against private corporations to
promote policy goals).
248.
Bonfield, supra note 3, at 570–71. Indeed, in states that have nonpartisan
districting commissions, “the political systems . . . are more politically responsive than those
in states where districts are drawn by partisan legislatures.” GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 20,
at 200 (citing Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Our Electoral Exceptionalism, 80 U. CHI. L. REV.
769 (2013)).
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responsiveness can also strengthen states relative to the federal government,
enhancing federalism’s benefits still further. 249
In addition, many Americans, even if they are in the electoral minority
where they live, may benefit from knowing that there are elected officials
elsewhere—whose campaigns they may have supported—promoting the issues and
positions they believe in. Some scholars label this “surrogate representation,” 250 and
they explain that it can ensure that even voters who are constituents of officials they
voted against can have representation through “the systemwide composition of the
legislature.”251 Indeed, this reality too can make losing more acceptable.
This surrogate representation can have particularly important national
effects in our time of partisan polarization. When one party controls the presidency,
for example, people who might otherwise feel alienated from their own country can
maintain “a sense of national community” by being part of “the out-group”
together.252 Put another way, federalism helps to mediate people’s disappointment
when their party is out of power at the national level. It “means that partisans on the
losing side of a national election need not see their ‘minority status as irreversible,’
in part because they are not a minority everywhere.” 253 But if some states are
dominated by a single party through entrenchment, whether through
gerrymandering, voter suppression, or other means, that can undermine the
effectiveness of surrogate representation, undermining people’s national and more
249.

As Bonfield puts it:
The net result of a constitutional exercise of [Article IV,] section 4 power
would be more vibrant and effective state government, with an
intensifying of the values to be derived therefrom. This, because the more
responsible and representative a state government becomes, the more it
fulfills the expectations of the federal system. National intervention to
secure these objectives would bolster the ability of local government to
ascertain, and thereby insure, the advancement and protection of
permissible local values. It would also assure better handling and
resolution of state problems through a more adequate expression of local
opinion and feeling. And it might conduce to a greater feeling of unity and
contentment with state government, thereby strengthening it as a bulwark
against federal usurpation and the dangers of autocracy. Further, national
intervention could secure broader popular consent, or at least acceptance
of social experimentation undertaken by the state, as well as provide more
of the people with a first hand opportunity to gain a meaningful
participation in government. Such broad based local control as would
result from an enforcement of the guarantee might also foster a desire in
the mass of the people to have local problems administered locally, instead
of giving them up to the national government where their control would
be more remote.
Bonfield, supra note 3, at 570–71.
250.
Bulman-Pozen, supra note 173, at 1132 (citing Jane Mansbridge, Rethinking
Representation, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 515, 522 (2003) (defining surrogate representation)).
251.
Mansbridge, supra note 250, at 524–25, quoted in Bulman-Pozen, supra note
173, at 1133.
252.
Bulman-Pozen, supra note 173, at 1115; see also id. at 1115–22.
253.
Id. at 1124.
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local political allegiances. In other words, antidemocratic entrenchment can have
spillover effects on the nation as a whole.
***
The specifics may be different from the Founding, but the insights that led
to the Guarantee Clause remain powerful. We have a national constitutional
commitment to democratic republicanism that began with the Framers’ nascent
belief in a government of elected representatives and has grown deeper and broader
with time. Certain forms of government are incompatible in a single nation;
antidemocratic beliefs and actions can have significant spillover effects; and there
are times when only the federal government can effectively protect our longstanding
national commitments.

V. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION TO ENFORCE THE GUARANTEE
The Guarantee Clause obligates “the United States” itself to enforce the
Guarantee, without limiting the grant of power to any particular branch. 254 It thus
provides independent authority for congressional action to regulate state elections,
voting, and government operations when necessary to protect the republican
democracies of the different states. 255 In fact, the Clause may require a federal
legislative response to state level actions when they threaten antidemocratic
spillovers.256 Section A of this Part develops the congressional role in enforcing the
Clause under such circumstances, describing the types of permissible regulation and
the advantages Congress has over other branches in enforcing the Clause. Section A
also briefly discusses the level of certainty and evidence of an antidemocratic
spillover threat needed to justify or require congressional action. My intent here,
however, is not to set forth a fully developed legal doctrine but rather to lay out its

254.
See Bonfield, supra note 3, at 523; Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 871.
255.
See Heller, supra note 37, at 1753–59 (arguing that the Clause could support
a variety of congressional actions as long as they are limited to addressing state government
structure and not substantive law); id. (arguing for federal anti-corruption laws, laws
governing voting rights and malapportionment, “legislative power grabs” and some forms of
popular initiatives); Rosen, Structural, supra note 125, at 453 (arguing that the political
branches, more than courts, should be responsible for protecting “Republican Legitimacy”);
Mark D. Rosen, Can Congress Play a Role in Remedying Dysfunctional Political
Partisanship?, 50 IND. L. REV. 265, 271–72 (2016) [hereinafter Rosen, Can Congress]
(arguing that Congress has power under the Guarantee Clause to enact “rules-of-the-road
regulations” for states when Congress reasonably deems them necessary to protect “the
legitimacy of representative government”); Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew
the Preclearance Provisions of the Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST.
L.J. 177, 204–06 (2005) (suggesting that the Guarantee Clause would support renewal of
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act). But see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (holding,
with no majority opinion, that Congress can set the qualifications of voters in congressional
and presidential elections but not in state and local elections); id. at 120–29 (opinion of Black,
J.) (explaining this position).
256.
Cf. Greene, supra note 3, at 1054 (“Congress has a constitutional duty under
the Guarantee Clause to remedy state capture by undemocratic factions . . . . ”).
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conceptual framework. Section B considers and responds to a variety of objections
to the argument.
A. Congressional Power to Act
The Guarantee Clause is one of several provisions that allows Congress to
regulate democratic processes within states. Article I, section 4 provides: “The
Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives
shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at
any time by Law make or alter such regulations except as to the places of chusing
Senators.” Such time-place-manner regulations, the Supreme Court has held,
whether issued by the state legislature or by Congress, are extremely broad. The
“comprehensive words” of this section “embrace authority to provide a complete
code for congressional elections, not only as to times and places, but in relation to
notices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud
and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and
making public election returns.” 257 And Congress likewise has some power to
regulate the conduct of presidential elections. 258
Congress has exercised these powers, including when it enacted the
National Voter Registration Act of 1993,259 also known as the Motor Voter Act, and
the Help America Vote Act of 2002.260 These laws required easier access to voter
registration and restricted the circumstances under which states could remove voters
from the rolls.261 These laws, however, did not require, or were not interpreted to
257.
Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932); see also Arizona v. Ariz. Inter
Tribal Council, Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 8 (2013) (noting that “[t]he Clause’s substantive scope is
broad” and citing Smiley); Mitchell, 400 U.S at 121–24 (opinion of Black, J.) (Congress has
control over suffrage requirements for congressional elections under Smiley and Article I,
§§ 2, 4); Ass’n of Cmty. Org. for Reform Now (ACORN) v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 793–95 (7th
Cir. 1995) (upholding provisions of the National Voter Registration Act because it requires
voters to be able to register for federal elections only when obtaining drivers licenses, in
reliance on Smiley and its progeny).
258.
Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 544–47 (1934) (quoting Ex parte
Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 657–58, 663, 666–67 (1884)); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4;
ACORN, 56 F.3d at 793 (describing Burroughs as holding that congressional power over
presidential elections is “coextensive with” its power over congressional elections). Rosen
argues that this doctrine and the “Chusing of Electors” Clause “likely give Congress all the
power it needs to regulate rules-of-the-road of federal elections,” with “any gaps . . . [to be]
filled in by the Necessary and Proper Clause.” Rosen, Can Congress, supra note 255, at 270.
259.
52 U.S.C. § 20501 (1993).
260.
52 U.S.C. § 20901 (2002).
261.
In the current Congress, the House of Representatives has passed H.R.1, also
known as the For the People Act, which would, among other things, require states to set up
independent commissions for congressional redistricting and would ban partisan
gerrymandering. H.R.1, 116th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 2401, 2411 (1st Sess. 2019). Senate
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell has refused to bring H.R.1 to the Senate floor, so it has no
chance of passage in this Congress. Chris Marquette, HR1 Provides Freshman House
Democrats a McConnell 101 Lesson, ROLL CALL (June 5, 2019, 2:24 PM),
https://www.rollcall.com/news/congress/freshmen-house-dems-urge-action-frommcconnell-on-hr1.
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require, states to adopt the same practices with respect to state and local elections as
they did for federal elections.262 Certainly many, if not most, states chose to do so if
for no other reason than administrative convenience, but the Article I, section 4
power, which speaks only to congressional elections, does not itself empower
Congress to impose such requirements.
Congress can, of course, regulate state elections and voting practices to
vindicate individual rights under the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twentythird, Twenty-fourth, and Twenty-sixth Amendments. It can enforce “by reasonable
legislation” the rights set forth in each of those provisions. And Congress has indeed
at times acted to enforce them,263 although the precise scope of its power under these
Amendments remains contested.264
The Guarantee Clause, however, gives Congress broad powers to
determine what the republican form of government means and what means are
necessary to guarantee it, and the Necessary and Proper Clause applies to the
exercise of those powers as well. 265 Congress is the entity best situated to know
what, given “the flux of contemporary values,” the people understand a republican
form of government to be.266 Indeed, pursuant to the Guarantee Clause, not only did
Congress impose requirements on the confederate states that would have been
anathema at the Founding,267 but it loosened other requirements. For example, at
least some during the Founding believed that a bicameral legislature was an essential
attribute of the republican form of government. 268 Yet in 1867, Congress admitted
Nebraska, with its unicameral legislature, to the Union, while at the same time
requiring it to provide for universal male suffrage, which certainly had not existed
at the Founding.269

262.
See, e.g., ACORN, 56 F.3d at 792–93 (describing scope of the National Voter
Registration Act).
263.
See, e.g., Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (1982); Ex parte Yarbrough,
110 U.S. at 660–67 (upholding criminal convictions under a federal statute outlawing
interference with voting in federal elections).
264.
See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 550–56 (2013) (in 5–4 decision,
striking down part of the Voting Rights Act as outside the scope of Congress’s power under
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments); id. at 559–94 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
265.
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (granting Congress the power to “make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all . . . Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States”).
266.
A Niche for the Guarantee Clause, supra note 3, at 691 (arguing that this is
one reason the Guarantee Clause is generally appropriately considered a political question);
see also Bonfield, supra note 3, at 542–43 (citing various Reconstruction-era members of
Congress who argued that the meaning of republican form of government was subject to
change over time). Ginsburg and Huq argue that the Framers themselves likely would have
wanted modern-day Americans to use new information about what works to maintain our
democratic republic. GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 20, at 168.
267.
See supra Section II.C.
268.
WIECEK, supra note 10, at 27.
269.
Id.
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Indeed, to the limited extent that the Supreme Court has considered the
definition of “a republican form of government,” it has deferred to Congress, and
has said that the Clause is for Congress to enforce.270 In Minor v. Happersett, a preNineteenth Amendment case, for example, the Court rejected a claim that the
Guarantee Clause required women’s suffrage. 271 Instead, the Court deferred to
Congress’s apparent conclusion, as manifest in its decisions to admit and readmit
states that denied women the right to vote, that such disenfranchisement did not
violate the Clause. 272 In Texas v. White, the Court commented (in dicta) that in
enforcing the Clause when readmitting confederate states to the Union, “a discretion
in the choice of means is necessarily allowed.”273
Congress also has much more flexibility in enforcing the Clause than do
courts. While courts can act only when an injury has occurred or is imminent,
Congress can take proactive and prophylactic measures when necessary. Indeed, the
Founding-era definition of “guaranty” included taking preventive efforts. 274
Particular prodemocratic measures may cease to be effective over time. New
challenges could arise.275 Comparative law scholars, historians, and political
270.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 220, 242 (1962) (quoting Luther v. Borden, 48
U.S. 1, 36 (1849)).
271.
88 U.S. 162 (1874).
272.
See id. at 177.
273.
74 U.S. 700, 728–29 (1868). See Bonfield, supra note 3, at 544 n.141
(interpreting the passage to mean that the Clause gives “the United States . . . power to act
affirmatively” and that “[t]he word ‘guarantee’ conferred broad powers to effectuate the
provision’s purposes”); see also id. (noting disagreement); Rosen, Structural, supra note 125,
at 398 (citing AMAR, BIOGRAPHY, supra note 10, at 370–76). The Court similarly explained
that Congress had the power to implement the domestic violence clause:
It rested with Congress, too, to determine upon the means proper to be
adopted to fulfill this guarantee. They might, if they had deemed it most
advisable to do so, have placed it in the power of a court to decide when
the contingency had happened which required the Federal government to
interfere.
Luther, 48 U.S. at 43. Instead, Congress gave the power to the President. Id.
274.
See WIECEK, supra note 10, at 59 (arguing that the Clause incorporates a
“positive, prophylactic guarantee, to be secured by the civil branches of the federal
government”); Bonfield, supra note 3, at 523 (arguing that the use of the word “guarantee” at
the time of the Founding “would have empowered the United States to take measures that
would protect, as well as restore, republican government”); id. at 524 (arguing that the
Framers could not have intended to give the central government “power limited so that it
could intervene only when it was too late? And in any obligation to restore, must there not be
implied a power to preserve?”); Rosen, Can Congress, supra note 255, at 271–72; Heller,
supra note 37, at 1738 (discussing Founding-era dictionary definition of “guaranty” as
including “[t]o protect; to defend” and “[t]o preserve by caution”) (quoting 1 SAMUEL
JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, W. Strahan et al., 5th ed.,
1773)). But see Williams, supra note 37, at 624–25, 675 (arguing that eighteenth-century use
of “guarantee” implied a treaty-like obligation that could be invoked only at the request of
the state facing a threat to its form of government).
275.
Imagine, for example, if states began providing for extraordinarily long, even
lifetime, terms of office for executive officials or legislators. One could easily imagine such
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scientists teach us that democracy requires upkeep and maintenance and that waiting
for demonstrable harm may mean waiting too long, especially in the face of the kind
of antidemocratic spirals that we may currently be facing. 276 Congress, more than
the courts, is likely to have the flexibility necessary to respond appropriately to such
events.
The Supreme Court in Luther acknowledged that one way Congress can
enforce the clause is to refuse to seat a state’s congressional delegation. 277 But
congressional action under the Clause cannot be limited to an action so extreme that
it amounts to a representational death penalty.278 Scholars make pains to tell us that
there are no magic bullets and indeed in the current environment, such an action
would likely inflame antidemocratic fervor rather than counter it.
There are unquestionably limits on congressional power under the
Guarantee Clause, although the details require additional development, and (as
suggested above), may change with circumstances, but the basic outlines of those
limits are clear from the argument already set forth. 279 Congressional action is
appropriate if it is aimed at state voting, election, and governance practices that have
or threaten antidemocratic spillovers. Today, this power might justify federal laws
that prohibit or limit state-level, lame-duck legislation that redistributes authority in
state government.280 It might include federal laws that require election officials for
both federal and state elections to be nonpartisan and appointed instead of elected,
or that prohibit election officials from presiding over elections in which they are on
the ballot.281 Other federal laws could prohibit extreme partisan gerrymandering of
state legislatures.282 They could mandate criteria for distribution, maintenance, and
a move, designed to entrench power, being part of an antidemocratic spiral. Because there are
no such provisions currently in the offing, there currently is no basis for Congress to legislate
against them. But if they became a meaningful possibility, that could well change. See
Bonfield, supra note 3, at 515 n.8 (pointing to extremely long terms of office in state
government, or making offices hereditary, as potentially violating the Clause).
276.
See supra Part IV.
277.
Luther, 48 U.S. at 35.
278.
Of course, Congress might refuse to seat a state’s congressional delegation in
the face of such extreme circumstances as a coup or announcement of a monarchy, but that
would be such an extreme action that it could be counterproductive at best and it is easy to
imagine how it could lead to a crisis-level breakdown in national cohesion.
279.
See supra Section V.A.
280.
Cf. Heller, supra note 37, at 1757–58 (arguing that the Clause could protect
against “legislative power grabs,” by which he appears to mean legislatures encroaching on
executive power and thus undermining separation of powers).
281.
Ginsburg and Huq endorse nonpartisan election administration. GINSBURG &
HUQ, supra note 20, at 208–10.
282.
Bonfield, supra note 3, at 567 (arguing that the Clause allows Congress to
address “malapportionment and gerrymandering” and that “Congress can use the guarantee
clause to liberalize state voting requirements and thereby ensure a broader based electorate”
and specifically noting the elimination of the poll tax in state elections as within congressional
power); see also Heller, supra note 37, at 1755 nn.214–17, 1756 (citing Michael W.
McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current Consequences, 24
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 114–15 (2000)) (arguing for anti-malapportionment laws).
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security of voting machines; opening and closing polling places; and voter
identification requirements.283
But note what would not be covered. Absent a meaningful threat of
antidemocratic spillovers, Congress does not ordinarily have power to legislate
anything about the internal structure of state government. No one imagines that
Nebraska’s unicameral legislature causes antidemocratic spillover effects, and it is
hard to concoct a justification for congressional regulation or invalidation of that
structure. Likewise, many states provide for direct democracy to varying degrees,
and although the Framers actively feared direct democracy and saw it as contrary to
the republican form of government, it does not today appear to be leading to
antidemocratic spillovers, even when it leads to significant state-level dysfunction
—as when, for example, voter initiatives in California hobble legislators’ budgeting
authority by limiting taxing authority and restricting spending choices.284 It seems
similarly unlikely that Congress could interfere with new state and local experiments
in ranked-choice voting 285 or prevent a state from experimenting with a
parliamentary system instead of the three branches that the Framers envisioned as
part of republican government, although no state has yet tried to do so.286
Such limits on congressional power are consistent with Coyle v. Smith, the
rare case in which the Supreme Court held that congressional action pursuant to the
Guarantee Clause went too far.287 In Coyle, Congress admitted Oklahoma to the
Union on the condition that it not move its state capital, then in Guthrie, until at least
1913.288 This law was defended in part as an exercise of congressional power to
283.
Ginsburg and Huq make similar arguments, although they stop short of the
kind of regulation I am proposing:
Congress might create a nonpartisan center for excellence in poll
management, capable of identifying and disseminating best practices;
providing careful empirical studies of barriers to voting (and discrediting
fallacious claims of voter fraud aimed at suppressing voter turnout for
political opponents and, in some instances, racial and ethnic minorities);
and developing regulation in response to systemic threats to election
administration on the national level – say, of the kind posed by Russian
interference in the 2016 national polls.
GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 20, at 210.
284.
This phenomenon is sometimes called “ballot-box budgeting.” See Heller,
supra note 37, at 1758–59.
285.
See Lee Drutman, Laboratories of Democracy: San Francisco Voters Rank
Their Candidates. It’s Made Politics a Little Less Nasty., VOX (July 31, 2019, 9:24 AM),
https://www.vox.com/the-highlight/2019/7/24/20700007/maine-san-francisco-rankedchoice-voting.
286.
See A Niche for the Guarantee Clause, supra note 3, at 692 (arguing that “[i]f
state self-government means anything, it means the right to be different, innovative, even
deviant in the search for new ways to institutionalize popular control over public
decisionmaking”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, supra note 37 (explaining that the Clause
“could be no impediment to reforms of the State constitution by a majority of the people in a
legal and peaceable mode”).
287.
221 U.S. 559 (1911).
288.
Id.
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guarantee a republican form of government in making its admission decision and,
as such, was a political question.289 The Court rejected this contention, relying on
the equal-footing doctrine, which provides that newly admitted states are “entitled
to and possess[] . . . all the rights of dominion and sovereignty which belonged to
the original states.”290 And it held that determining the location of the state capital
is part of such sovereignty. 291 Seen through the lens of spillovers, this holding is
clearly correct. It is hard to imagine how moving the state capital away from Guthrie
before 1913 could possibly cause any antidemocratic spillovers, and the invocation
of the Clause seems entirely pretextual.
And as Coyle suggests, some judicial review of congressional action under
the Clause is appropriate. But because the Supreme Court has held most claims
brought under the Clause to be nonjusticiable, any review should be highly
deferential. Having provided virtually no guidance on the scope and meaning of the
Clause, the Court should not now require Congress to play guessing games about
what it can do to enforce the Clause. By deeming the Clause a political question in
almost every situation, the Court has chosen not to explicate it, 292 and so it should
give Congress some meaningful space to reinvigorate it. For that reason, as well as
because, as described above, Congress is the branch best-suited to identify what a
republican form of government is and to identify appropriate preventive and
remedial measures, the Court’s deference to Congress in interpreting and enforcing
the Clause should be broad. In particular, Congress is due more here than the limited
deference the Court gives congressional efforts to enforce individual rights pursuant
to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 293 Unlike those amendments, the
Clause does not provide an individual right that must be balanced against state
sovereignty.294 Rather, it is a structural principle arising from the recognition both
that certain forms of government would be incompatible and that states cannot
themselves prevent their neighbors from adopting those forms of government. The
Clause requires balancing different states’ governance and sovereignty interests, as
well as the states’ and the federal government’s interests in national cohesion. When

289.
Id. at 564–66.
290.
Id. at 577 (quoting Bollin v. Nebraska, 176 U.S. 83, 87 (1900)).
291.
Id. at 579.
292.
See cases cited supra note 2.
293.
Cf. Metzger, supra note 60, at 1514 (arguing that congressional power under
Article IV generally is more expansive than under the Fourteenth Amendment). Some might
argue that if the Court can’t adjudicate claims brought directly under the Clause, it should not
adjudicate challenges to Guarantee Clause-enforcing legislation. Such extreme judicial
passivity would be, in my view, inappropriate, however. As Bonfield says “judicial abstinence
would give Congress unlimited power to impose on the states whatever government it deemed
republican.” Bonfield, supra note 3, at 564.
294.
See Zafran, supra note 3, at 1449–55 (arguing that the Clause should be
understood to guarantee popular sovereignty and to combat “lockup” or entrenchment,
allowing courts to shift their attention to structural problems and the cumulative effects of
different laws and away from claims of individual First Amendment and Equal Protection
claims); see also Bonfield, supra note 3, at 563 (noting that Framers wanted “the guarantee
to be mandatory and to serve as protection against both majority and minority abuse”).
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Congress acts reasonably to protect each state’s government from deleterious
antidemocratic spillovers, the Court should defer.
B. Objections and Answers
The primary objections to my arguments arise from concerns for federalism
and state sovereignty. Some of these objections sound in originalism. Certainly, the
Framers did not understand the Clause to empower Congress to pass the kinds of
laws I suggest above. To the contrary, “the regime of electoral authoritarianism that
characterized the American South for much of its history was perceived as (and
probably was in fact) faithful to the founding promise in ways that multiracial,
pluralist democracy was not.”295 And the politics of the Founding Era were full of
constitutional hardball and mistrust that democracy scholars might wince at today. 296
“It took several decades for this hard-edged quest for permanent victory to
subside,”297 and for the nation to develop constitutional and democratic norms and
commitments.
But the Framers did believe that there had to be some uniformity in the
types of government among the states and that there was at least one type of
government—monarchy—that would pose an actual threat to other states and to the
country as a whole.298 And realistically, a federal guarantee was necessary to protect
against that threat. Enforcing the Guarantee Clause is well beyond any one state’s
abilities.299
Reading today’s democracy scholars, it is striking how close their
contemporary nightmare scenario is to the Framers’ fears of entrenched,
factionalized power.300 These scholars describe a Republican Party, many of whose
members are set on entrenching power in a white minority, which as Levitsky and
Ziblatt point out, would be “profoundly antidemocratic.”301 They continue:
Such measures would trigger resistance from a broad range of forces,
including progressives, minority groups, and much of the private
sector. This resistance could lead to escalating confrontation and even
violent conflict, which, in turn, could bring heightened police
repression and private vigilantism – in the name of “law and
order.”302

The Framers might have taken white supremacy as a given, but they certainly
wanted to build a political structure that would avoid that kind of strife and potential
for violence. The Guarantee Clause’s core commitments and insights remain vital
today.

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 20, at 207.
See, e.g., LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 20, at 102–03, 119–20.
Id. at 120.
See supra Section I.B.
Balkin, Commerce, supra note 27, at 11–12.
See supra Section I.B.
LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 20, at 207.
Id. at 207–08.
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Ryan Williams’ new textualist and originalist reading of the Clause offers
a different perspective on its original meaning. He argues that the word “guarantee”
had a particular meaning under international law in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, and among other things, only the party protected by the guarantee, and
not the guarantor, could invoke it.303 He suggests therefore that the guarantee should
be something that can be invoked only by each state individually with respect to
threats to its own government.304 But this limitation is inconsistent with the fact,
acknowledged by Williams, that the Clause was designed in part to protect states
from each other,305 and it does not explain the guarantee being extended to “every
State,” as discussed supra, instead of to “each State,” like other promises in the same
part of the Constitution. Additionally, the guarantee cannot be understood to apply
only in the face of violence, which would make it duplicative of the protection
against invasion and domestic insurrection also found in section 4. 306 Nor does
Williams’ view that the guarantee should be seen as actionable only at the request
of a state307 make sense in light of its pairing with the promise of protection against
invasion, which incorporates no such requirement, and seems at odds with the
limitation of protection against “domestic violence” to occasions when such
protection is explicitly sought—a limitation that does not apply to the Guarantee
Clause.308
Other scholars, largely led by Deborah Merritt, have argued that the
Guarantee Clause should be seen as a promise that states’ internal political workings
will almost always be off-limits to the federal government. “If the national
government pledges to maintain a republican form of government in each state, then
a fortiori, the national government promises to maintain some government in each
state.”309 And interfering with the mechanics of state government would undermine
the “autonomous nature of the relationship between state governments and their
voters,” thus undermining the republican nature of those governments. 310 In other
303.
Williams, supra note 37, at 672, 675–76.
304.
Id. at 675–76.
305.
Id. at 629.
306.
Id. at 648–55 (citing some Framers who read it that way and some who
disagreed); id. at 650 (arguing that the Clause is best read not to “inhibit states from making
voluntary changes to their existing governments [but] rather [as] merely a protection against
violent usurpations of political authority”).
307.
Id. at 676.
308.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
309.
Deborah Jones Merritt, Republican Governments and Autonomous States: A
New Role for the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 815, 819 (1994) [hereinafter Merritt,
New Role]; see also Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy:
Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1988).
310.
Merritt, New Role, supra note 309, at 820. She argues that the Motor Voter
law might run afoul of her principle—although it would be entirely consistent with mine. Id.
at 825. The Motor Voter law is problematic because she thinks unfunded mandates imposed
on the states by the federal government “infringe state autonomy by shifting politically
unpalatable tasks to the states. When governmental action engenders strong opposition, or
when the costs of a regulatory program are high, members of Congress have a substantial
motive to shift the political onus or economic costs . . . .” Id. at 824. That undermines the state
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words, she sees the Clause as a kind of guarantee of federalism. This approach to
the Clause lacks textual support.311 Its underlying insight, however, is consistent
with my argument. Both of us see the Clause as part of a commitment to an overall
federal structure. But unlike Merritt, who is worried primarily about federal
overreach and vertical federalism, my approach focuses on horizontal federalism,
national cohesion, and the threats that states can pose to both.
Erwin Chemerinsky has suggested that there may be other limitations on
congressional power under the Guarantee Clause. In particular, he suggests that the
anti-commandeering principle of the Tenth Amendment, as articulated in New York
v. United States, might preclude Congress from “declar[ing a] particular state
practice illegal and commanding the state to adopt a new law changing its ways.”312
But as Chemerinsky himself notes:
New York might be read narrowly to involve only instances in which
Congress compels states to adopt and administer federal regulatory
programs. Also, an exception . . . could be recognized for instances
in which Congress acts to guarantee that states have a republican form
of government. Article IV’s authorization could be viewed as
trumping the Tenth Amendment concerns because of the former’s
specific grant of power to the federal government over state
government structure and processes.313

Given the significant structural safeguards the Guarantee Clause provides, this
reading is more consistent with a healthy respect for federalism than is an absolutist
reading of the Tenth Amendment.
Understanding the relationship between federalism and the Guarantee
Clause reconciles the proper reading of the Clause with sweeping generalizations
about state power in a variety of Supreme Court opinions. Particularly in the last
two or three decades, the Court has frequently relied on the principle that
“federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of
sovereign power.”314 The Court has noted that “the Framers . . . intended the States
to keep for themselves, as provided in the Tenth Amendment, the power to regulate
elections,”315 “to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be
exercised,”316 and “to prescribe the qualifications of its officers and the manner in

legislature’s accountability to its own citizens, thus undermining its republican form of
government.
311.
See Williams, supra note 37, at 656.
312.
Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 877 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144 (1994)). Chemerinsky also suggests that such laws might run afoul of Coyle v. Smith, 221
U.S. 559 (1911). Id.
313.
Id. at 877–78.
314.
Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 543 (2013) (quoting Bond v. United
States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011)) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
315.
Id. (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461–62 (1991) (quoting
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413. U.S. 634, 647 (1973))).
316.
Id. (quoting Carrington v. Rush, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965)).

2020]

DEMOCRACY AND FEDERALISM

237

which they shall be chosen.” 317 All of this is so in the context of internal state
governance that does not implicate the Guarantee Clause. 318
The distinction between justified and unjustified federal regulation is
evident in the cases from which the above quotes are taken. Gregory v. Ashcroft, for
example, is frequently cited for the principle that states have the basic power to set
the qualifications of their elected officials due to each state’s “obligation . . . ‘to
preserve the basic conception of a political community.’” 319 But Gregory was not
about congressional power to prevent antidemocratic spillovers from different
states’ self-governance decisions. Instead, it considered, although it did not
ultimately decide, whether Congress has the power to apply a general agediscrimination policy to state judges.320 Against the general background principles
relating to state-level self-government, and with no reason to believe that Congress
had been acting to protect the republican form of government (or even any
discussion of that possibility), the Court held that, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act did not reach state
judges.321
Other cases in which the Court has described state self-governance as a
central constitutional principle involve Equal Protection challenges to a variety of
state laws—from durational residency requirements for voters, which it has struck
down,322 to limitations on public employment for noncitizens, which it has upheld
317.
Id. (quoting Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 161 (1892)).
318.
As Justice Harlan explained, at the Founding, the states retained “the power to
set state voting qualifications . . . except to the extent that the guarantee of a republican form
of government may be thought to require a certain minimum distribution of political power.”
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 201 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). In Mitchell, the Court evaluated the constitutionality of a series of amendments to
the Voting Rights Act. In a series of fractured opinions, with an opinion by Justice Black
announcing the judgment, the Court upheld provisions lowering the voting age to 18 for
federal elections, abolishing literacy tests and durational residency requirements for voting in
presidential elections. It struck down the provision lowering the voting age to 18 in state and
local elections, precipitating the enactment of the Twenty-sixth Amendment. Four justices
(Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall) would have upheld all of the challenged provisions,
including lowering the voting age for state and local elections. Four Justices (Harlan, Stewart,
Burger, and Blackmun) would have struck down the voting age provisions for both state and
federal elections, and Justice Harlan also would have struck down the durational residency
requirements. All justices agreed that the ban on literacy tests was constitutional as consistent
with Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Congress did
not claim to be relying on the Guarantee Clause for any of the provisions. See also Bonfield,
supra note 3, at 567 (arguing that giving states the power to decide who national electors are
by means of deciding who state electors are, Art. I, § 2; Am. 17, § 1, “in no way conflicts
with Congress’s power to regulate those requirements in the interest of preserving republican
government. The states were given a free hand so long as the United States found it
unnecessary to intervene pursuant to its duty under Article IV.”).
319.
Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461 (quoting Dunn v. Blumbstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344
(1972)).
320.
Id. at 457–64.
321.
Id. at 470.
322.
Dunn, 405 U.S. at 330.
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for jobs deemed essential to self-government but not when states enact blanket
restrictions.323 These cases involve the relationship between state-level regulation
and individual rights—and in many of them, despite the soaring language about state
control of its own governance, the Court in fact struck down restrictions on who
states count as members of their political communities.324 But most importantly for
understanding their implications here, they simply do not address congressional
power at all, much less its power under the Guarantee Clause.
Many of these cases are cited in Shelby County v. Holder, in which the
Supreme Court struck down the part of the Voting Rights Act that imposed special
obligations on certain states before they could make any changes related to voting
or elections.325 The Court rested its holding in large part on a principle of “equal
sovereignty” that it said made it improper for Congress to impose regulations related
to elections on only some states without highly specific justifications, even when
acting under its Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment enforcement powers. 326
Shelby County is deeply problematic and has justly been extensively criticized, 327
but it does not bar congressional action under my reading of the Guarantee Clause.
For one thing, much of the legislation I envision would be national in scope. In fact,
aside from the equal sovereignty holding of Shelby County, there is a powerful
substantive reason to make most if not all the reforms discussed above universal.
Across-the-board regulation—that is regulation that members of the congressional
majority are willing to impose on their own states—is likely to appear less punitive
and less partisan than more targeted legislation and is thus more likely to help deescalate our current antidemocratic trends.328
This is not to say, however, that congressional regulation pursuant to the
Guarantee Clause is limited to across-the-board legislation. The Guarantee Clause
protects against despots out of fear for their destabilizing effect on other states. 329
Imagine if a state’s governor simply refused to leave office at the end of his term,
refused to obey the orders of state or federal courts, and ordered the state police to
enforce his edicts. Such circumstances, however unlikely, would be the extreme
circumstance in which congressional action might be warranted before any evidence
of antidemocratic spillovers arise. Indeed, Huey Long’s campaign of terror and
undermining of democratic processes in 1930s Louisiana prompted many citizens
of Louisiana to beg the federal government for help, explicitly invoking the Clause,
and led President Franklin Roosevelt to seriously contemplate federal intervention
323.
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
324.
See, e.g., Dunn, 405 U.S. at 330 (striking down durational residency
requirements for voting); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (striking down Texas law
prohibiting members of the military who move to Texas as part of their service from voting).
325.
570 U.S. 529 (2013).
326.
Id. at 544–46.
327.
See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Current Conditions, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2013
6:57 PM), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/current-conditions/?_r=0.
328.
See LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 20, at 215–18 (arguing against
Democrats adopting tactics of Republicans because such escalation is likely to continue the
death spiral).
329.
See Section I.B.
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pursuant to the Guarantee Clause. 330 (Long was assassinated before the federal
government made any decisions or committed to any action.) 331 But this
hypothetical use of the Clause is not the focus of this Article.
The final objections to my arguments are less about my general reading of
the Clause than about my specific concerns and proposals for legislation. Indeed,
one could agree with my reading of the Clause but disagree that congressional action
is currently called for. These objections sound in politics. Some may see my
arguments as a partisan attempt to advance the goals and electoral fortunes of the
Democratic Party. And certainly my arguments here are largely consistent with the
positions and interests of those who have my political sympathies. But as democracy
scholars have demonstrated, the current threats to our democratic republic are
disproportionately emerging from the political right. 332 In fact, that reality is the very
reason my argument may be seen as a form of partisan constitutional hardball.
“Unfortunately and paradoxically, the ‘voting wars’ have reached such a high
temperature that even effectuating . . . temperature-lowering, anti-hardball solutions
might in some cases require constitutional hardball.”333 My argument is thus best
seen as what Fishkin and Pozen call “anti-hardball”—an opportunity to force deescalation and “tak[e] certain types of constitutional hardball off the table” for the
future.334
And then there is the Cassandra problem. The 2018 midterm elections
turned out to be highly competitive—despite significant gerrymandering and
allegations of voter suppression and irregularities. The Democratic party not only
took control of the House of Representatives, but also a number of state legislatures,
governorships, and other statewide offices that it had not previously held. 335 Voters
in a number of states passed anti-gerrymandering or franchise-expanding
initiatives.336 But our highly polarized politics and well-documented antidemocratic
trends require vigilance. As Levitsky and Ziblatt put it, “[t]he tragic paradox of the
electoral route to authoritarianism is that democracy’s assassins use the very
institutions of democracy – gradually, subtly, and even legally – to kill it.” 337
Democracy scholars’ warnings of a piecemeal and gradual descent make clear that
330.
See generally Gerard N. Magliocca, Huey P. Long and the Guarantee Clause,
83 TUL. L. REV. 1 (2008).
331.
Id. at 36.
332.
See GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 20, at 241 (pointing to Republican Party as
more open to embracing democratic erosion); LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 20, at 145–
67, 172–75 (tracing current circumstances back to Newt Gingrich and putting most of the
onus on the Republican party); id. at 170–71 (explaining how racial and religious polarization
now maps onto partisanship); Shugerman, supra note 191, at 122 (arguing that Republicans
are significantly more aggressive in their use of constitutional hardball and beanball than are
Democrats).
333.
Fishkin & Pozen, Asymmetric Hardball, supra note 185, at 981.
334.
Id.
335.
US Mid-Term Election Results 2018: Maps, Charts and Analysis, BBC NEWS
(Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-46076389.
336.
See supra Section III.A.
337.
LEVISTKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 20, at 8.
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waiting until antidemocratic harms reach a certain level may well mean waiting too
long.338

CONCLUSION
American democracy today is threatened and strained. There are no
panaceas, but strengthening our democratic institutions and operations is essential.
The Guarantee Clause offers one avenue. The Clause arose from a recognition that
the states’ governments do not operate in political vacuums. Although there is
substantial room for diversity of and experimentation with state government
structure, without core commitments to participatory democracy and representative
governments, the states could not remain united. As we face threats today to those
commitments, it is time to turn again to the Guarantee.

338.

See, e.g., GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 20, at 242–43.

